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PEOPLE'S WAR AS AN ELEMENT OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "People's War as an Element of Chinese Foreign Policy"

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DEDICATION

Considering the extensive assistance that a number of friends provided in the creation of this paper, I dedicate it to them. I thank my supervisory committee and especially H.W. Cummins for the patience and guidance that was repeatedly needed. In another respect I must thank several of my fellow students who provided the intellectual and nutritional sustenance that allowed the completion of this work. Their gracious "endorsement" of my paper made it both possible and enjoyable.

ABSTRACT

The People's Republic of China's recent advances into the international community have created serious questions as to her continued support of foreign revolutions, or in Chinese terms, "people's wars". This study proceeded to ascertain the contemporary fate of China's rhetorical assistance to people's wars and particularily how this assistance has related to the general considerations of foreign policy. The study fell into two main sections. The first was a review of the relevant literature on Peking's support of foreign revolutions in the years between 1965 and 1970 with particular emphasis on its theoretical content, the actual history of its employment, and its functional value in terms of China's domestic and international objectives. The second step was an examination of China's contemporary position as reflected in a content analysis of Peking Review in the period between January 1971 and July 1974. Contrary to the expectation that Chinese support of people's wars is dead, it was found that while the total number of endorsed revolutions has dropped from the peak "revolutionary" years of the Cultural Revolution, support of foreign insurgencies is still an evident component of official Chinese statements. This situation can be explained in terms of the present global balance of power and the internal political values of the PRC. Indeed, barring dramatic changes in either of these areas, it was predicted that support of people's wars will continue into the forseeable future.

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INTRODUCTION

By the end of 1971 and the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United Nations, it was very clear that China's foreign policy had entered a new phase. Events such as President Nixon's visit to China, the departure of American ground troops from Vietnam, dramatic increases in China's world trade and a lessening of tension with Japan soon followed, indicating an expansion of the PRC's international contacts and some manner of detente with the Western powers. Whether or not we ascribe the primary initiative for the "normalization" of Chinese foreign relations to developments in domestic Chinese politics, to a softening in the American position, or to larger changes in the global balance of power, it was apparent that a fresh wind was blowing, so much so that "China by 1973 had changed its foreign policy as fundamentally as had the United States" (Johnson, 1973: 4). What is not so apparent is how this realignment has affected specific policy areas.

This new international posture for the PRC has persuaded several observers that China has abandoned its support of national liberation movements, or in Chinese terms, people's wars. The Chinese failure to assist recent people's wars in Bangladesh, Ethiopia (Eritrean Liberation Front) and in Ceylon is cited as evidence that China has indeed lost "its revolutionary soul" (Editor, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1971:3). Furthermore, of nine prominant experts asked what implications China's "new diplomacy" would have regarding support of foreign revolutions, all agreed that, for the moment, state to state relations would take priority over assistance to national liberation struggles (Problems of Communism, 1971:4).[1] More dramatically, Chalmers Johnson in Autopsy on People's War argues that Chinese support for people's wars has passed into the realm of history; people's war as an element of Chinese foreign policy is dead. Of course he does not mean that revolutionary activity around the world has ceased, but rather he believes that Chinese support of these revolutions has disappeared, concluding that "the Chinese are now ending their period of active revolutionary ecumenicism" and that "people's war as it was understood in the sixties had died by the early seventies" (Johnson, 1973:4).

However, there does exist contrary evidence. The Editor of Current Scene has noted that "Peking's current efforts to mend its relations abroad have not noticeably curtailed comment in the Chinese press reaffirming China's commitment to world revolution" (August 1971:9). Moreover, in a brief but powerful analysis of the modern fate of people's war, Daniel Lovelace argues "these modifications may reflect a change in emphasis or tactics rather than the adoption of a wholly new strategy" and that the PRC "cannot be expected to give up this important element of its foreign policy in the near future" (Lovelace, 1971:94, 101). Has an autopsy on people's war been either premature or performed on the wrong body? If people's war is dead, one more tombstone will mark the grave. However, if a vivisection, not an autopsy, has been conducted, we need soon begin the exhumation.

From the historical perspective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Maoist conception of world order, Chinese support for foreign wars of national liberation has consistently been a critical element of Chinese foreign policy. With this in mind, it is imperative for the analyst to examine this theory of people's war in terms of the recent shifts in Peking's international position. Simply stated: Has the challenge of "Long Live the Victory of People's War" (Peking Review, September 1, 1965) and other rhetorical and material assistance for foreign liberation struggles given way to less radical strategies? In general, a world power exercises its influence not only within its own borders, but deliberately seeks to expand its sphere of dominance, and the central concern is whether or not people's war is still an effective means of furthering Chinese ends. The answer to this question is of immediate importance to decision makers who must deal with the PRC and to scholars who are attempting to fathom the logic and dynamics of Chinese behaviour. However, it is also of critical importance to guerilla fighters who look to China for support and leadership. Has

Peking's proletarian internationalism in the form of people's wars been eliminated as an element of Chinese foreign policy?

It should be made very clear from the outset that the term "people's war" has been used in two rather distinct ways. The first, and the one originally developed by the Chinese Communists in their struggle against Chiang Kai-shek, is a rather precise explication of a military and political strategy designed to defeat the opposition in armed conflict.[2] In its strictest sense it is a seven step plan for victory involving; united front tactics, reliance of the leading role of the party, formation and defence of base areas, peasant mobilization, guerilla war strategy, self reliance and a minimum of outside assistance (Robinson, 1969: 65). More simply, people's war in this first meaning has four ingredients; primacy of political objectives and psychological tactics, profound confidence in the politically mobilized and indoctrinated masses, faith in the supremacy of human will over weapons, and finally, conviction that a protracted struggle will bring victory (Rolph, 1970: 53).

The second meaning of the term, and that most commonly used by western analysts,[3] takes people's war out of a uniquely Chinese historical context and views it in terms of its impact as a part of Chinese foreign policy. Specifically, a people's war is any type of armed insurrection Peking sees as a people's movement, regardless of whether it meets all the characteristics outlined above. Thereby, support of a foreign revolution becomes support of a people's war notwithstanding theoretical inconsistency. Peking demands only that the overthrow of the existing government be the insurgent's goal and that armed struggle be the means used. Although some work has been done in examining the dynamics of people's war in its technical sense as indigenous to countries other than China,[4] its most prevalent meaning is clearly in the second context. "Insurgency, rebellion, civil war, local conflict, people's war are more or less interchangeable terms" (Girling, 1969: 11) and for the purposes of studying Chinese foreign policy I am using people's war to mean armed insurrection against established authority regardless of the specific military/political tactics employed by the insurgents.

THE LITERATURE

Roger Dial's observation that "the assumption and examination of China's support for external revolution runs through the whole literature with almost uniform consistency if not rigour" (1973: 44), underlines the abundance of research conducted on Peking's involvement in people's wars around the world. Readily visible "intervention" is a compelling subject for study. However, his observation also reveals that the literature is lacking and two major insufficiencies can be noted.

First, although extensive work has been conducted in each of the areas of the theory of people's war, the outputs of Chinese foreign policy and the domestic factors that constitute the inputs,[5] there have been no recent attempts to combine the three into an operational model or at least description of people's war as an element of Chinese foreign policy. As Van Ness noted in the introduction to his 1971 study, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, "much has been written in a general way about Communist China's foreign policy, but little as yet has been done in the way of systematic comparison of China's relations with different countries: (1970: 3).[6] His work provided valuable information in this area, but regrettably, there has been no follow up in the past four years.

Second, there also exists a marked scarcity of quantitative/statistical work in the area. In Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, Van Ness provided a simple empirical framework to measure the salience of people's war for the years 1965, 1966 and 1967, but there is no indication that his work has either been replicated or replaced by a new model. In very large part the question of the contemporary importance of Chinese involvement in people's wars is largely a quantitative one and a well defined empirical study could shed much light on a rather murky area.

As has been noted, Van Ness' framework satisfies both of these weaknesses and it is therefore the intent of this paper to apply a modified version of his technique to events since 1970. This framework is contingent on two major arguments. First, the technique is a measurement of China's public endorsement of foreign revolutions. Secret or clandestine assistance can be used as a background point, but cannot be part of the empirical research. The limitations this imposes on both our projects are rather obvious, but they are tempered by the fact that there is a very close correlation between Peking's rhetorical support and material assistance. "When they [Peking] are actively seeking to overthrow a foreign government, they generally make their position quite public and explicit" (Van Ness, 1970: 7). Further, Deidre Ryan notes that Peking's "support to the national communist party is explicit in every case (1972: 3), and in a somewhat backhanded way, General Samuel Griffith (USMC) supports Van Ness, arguing that "the Chinese have given full warning of their intentions to their intended victims" (1972: 12). In any case, information on any under-the-table transactions, if indeed such tactics are utilized, is simply not available and short of speculation the researcher is limited to that which is public.

The second argument is that the furtherance of people's wars be treated as only one aspect of Chinese external affairs. In practice, Peking's foreign policy is pursued on three levels; the official (state-to-state), semi-official (normally non-governmental agencies contacting virtually all countries whether they recognize the PRC or not)[7], and third, at the communist party levels. In most cases all three operate simultaneously. Therefore, a description of Peking's support must include the level at which the endorsement is given noting that the particular level discussed represents but one element of the overall relationship with the foreign government in question.

THE PROCEDURE

To provide an up to date summary of the condition of the support of people's wars, this investigation will be presented in two main chapters. The first will constitute an investigation of the meaning of people's war in terms of its theoretical groundings, how it is a part of the Maoist world view and how it has been employed ~~up~~ to 1970. The attempt is to set a historical perspective and to draw out those elements of the existing literature that are most useful in describing exactly what is under examination. Dealing with the totality of existing research on both foreign policy and people's war would be impossible and unnecessary as my interest is in the more narrowly circumscribed area where the two intersect. Therefore, the first chapter will primarily address two questions; first, what is the ideological and historical background of China's support for people's wars; and second, what was the actual support offered in the period between 1965 and 1970.

The second chapter falls into three overlapping sections. Section one is a quantitative study of Peking's endorsement of foreign revolutions in the contemporary period (January 1971-July 1974) as found in Peking Review. Using Van Ness' framework, public statements of support for people's wars as found in the Chinese press have been examined and recorded. These completed statements will be categorized in terms of geographical region, frequency of endorsement, and national status in order to identify new patterns in the support pattern. The critical point is that Peking does not support every war of national liberation: whom it selects is of vital importance to understanding the entire strategy. My immediate goal is to achieve some measure of insight into why one rebel group is supported and another is not as well as to the overall support pattern.

Section two will investigate the new realities in China's international position and the changing global balance of power that are critical to the PRC's contemporary foreign policy. The empirical results from section one are of considerable value in understanding the modern fate of China's involvement in foreign revolutions, but in order for these findings to have any descriptive and predictive power, the salient elements of the current international scene must be taken into account. Section three will then present a discussion of the relationship between support for people's wars and Chinese foreign policy in the contemporary era. A brief conclusion will summarize the important findings and outline some of the probable developments in this area of Chinese external affairs.

Before proceeding one final question must be dealt with. Thomas Robinson argues that Peking's support is often more symbolic than practical and has "never been a critical element of any national liberations struggle" (1971: 56). Therefore the question might well be raised as to why people's war is, in anything more than an historical sense, important to the student of Chinese politics. Several answers can be given. First, even though the level of material support is usually low, guerilla leaders urgently need and seek the theoretical encouragement and advice which Peking can supply. Second, as witnessed in the vast proliferation of counter-insurgency techniques, other powers find Chinese assistance to people's wars extremely important. It is very likely that this concern has been grossly exaggerated by the western powers. However, "what is interesting and what needs to be studied is the attempt to export revolution, the attempt to interfere with that export and the belief that both are possible" (Johnson, 1973: 7). Third, support of a revolution in a specific country is a direct signal of Peking's displeasure with that nation. As much as in fulfilling ideological promises, support of people's war is both a symbolic and practical method of "punishing" another state as well as communicating this feeling to the rest of the world in a highly visible form. Due to her limited capabilities and influence this has often been the only coercive technique available to the PRC and although not as direct or forceful as "landing the PLA", it has been a low risk, "bargain basement" mode of influence. In sum, the role of people's wars is critical to an understanding of Chinese foreign policy and its effectiveness and rationale are the subjects of this paper.

CHAPTER 1

THE THEORY, MECHANICS AND OPERATION OF PEOPLE'S WAR IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1965 AND 1970

Considering William Shakespeare's well known observation that "all that is past is prologue", an understanding of the contemporary condition of support of people's wars in large part depends on a comprehension of its operation in the past. Arguments for the importance of an accurate historical perspective are unnecessary and need not be revisited. What is demanded is an introduction to the manner in which this perspective will be presented. Mindful of the PRC's unique political and historical background, and considering the oft explored gap between theory and practice, I will present this chapter in three somewhat overlapping sections. The first will examine some of the traditional and ideological underpinnings of China's support for wars of national liberation. The second section will be an investigation of the actual nature and degree of support that Peking has extended to people's wars prior to the Cultural Revolution. Finally, to complete the period, the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Chinese foreign policy will be assessed. In order to facilitate updating this historical perspective to the contemporary period (post 1970) a brief note on support patterns in the 1968-1969 period will conclude the chapter.

SECTION I THE THEORETICAL AND TRADITIONAL BASES OF CHINESE SUPPORT OF PEOPLE'S WARS

A Methodological Note

> To find the basis for the foreign policy of a country it is necessary to ascertain why relevant decisions were actually made. This means looking at the thinking of the people who make the decisions, their image of their world and of their own policy, of finding which facts were factors to them and how they took them into account (Millar, 1967: 59).

Although Millar's observation is correct, the student of Chinese foreign policy is confronted by a geographical, cultural and conceptual screen that has precluded significant progress in this direction. However, I feel it is critical that such an effort must be made for "decision makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of states" (Holsti, 1969: 544), and to fully understand people's war as an element of Chinese foreign policy demands some exploration into world view and ideology in addition to the concerns of power politics. What do the Chinese perceive as reality in the external world, and more specifically, how does support of foreign revolutions fit into this outlook?

Several procedural points (and notes of caution!) should be made clear. First, because of the unrivalled longevity of the Chinese state, "the traditional Chinese civilization and culture run as a red thread through the various policies with other states" (Broekmeijer, 1969: 193). Beyond "looking at the map" and assessing Chinese capabilities, this involves a somewhat more esoteric analysis of some of those elements of the Chinese psyche that have their roots in the seemingly bottomless resevoir of Chinese history. Mao and the PRC's other leaders are older than the revolution and all, therefore, were educated under the intellectual and cultural matrix of traditional China. "It would be incredible if their percepts of an ideal world were not strongly influenced by these circumstances, subconsciously or otherwise" (Ginsburg, 1968: 74). Second, it should be cautioned that there does not exist a single, readily identifiable, Chinese image of world order and that any anthropological generalizations in this area "resound grandly in the vast cavern of our comparative ignorance" (Schwartz, 1967: 93).

Third, only for organizational purposes have the traditional "Chinese" concerns been separated from China's revolutionary experience and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought. Tradition and revolution have formed their own dynamic over the last fifty years and "to argue about the extent to which Communist China is either 'Communist' or 'Chinese' is simply not very productive" (Van Ness, 1971a: 197). Fourth, even though "we have been educated by the profundities of the social sciences and depth psychology to discount conscious verbal behaviour" (Schwartz, 1967: 92), in evaluating those factors most relevant to support of people's wars, I intend to rely primarily on official Chinese statements "on perhaps the naive assumption that what people say must be considered as at least one factor in explaining their behaviour" (Schwartz, 1967: 92).

Fifth and finally, there simply does not exist a theoretical framework for evaluating the relative strength of each of these considerations. Particularly in the instances of conflicting inputs (for example, the traditional desire for world stability versus the Marxist emphasis on revolution[1]), the limitations of this approach mirror the apparently contradictory dynamics of Chinese politics. However, to paraphrase Everett Hagen:-

> The argument of this section is admittedly a far reach from the facts at our disposal, yet this aspect of decision making (and ultimately foreign policy) is so fundamental and the relevant facts we now have so intriguing, that it seems useful to cover the ground even though the margin for error is great (Hagen, 1968: 200).

TRADITIONAL CHINA

The most immediate feature of China's traditional view of the world is implied in her name, chung kuo, roughly translated to mean the "middle kingdom". For two thousand years China to the Chinese, was not only the centre of the world, but in reality was the world, with surrounding states being less civilized (barbarian) in direct proportion to their distance from chung kuo. Despite the nations immense resources and population her superiority was deemed to originate in moral doctrine and cultural virtue rather than physical prowess. "Because the emperor embodied certain immutable moral truths his country was powerful and prosperous" (Huck, 1971: 18). Of course there have been many empires who have claimed this same superiority, but "the uniqueness of the Chinese case lies in the persistence of such claims into the twentieth century" (Schwartz, 1967: 93). China's neighbours respected her preeminence and for two millenia delegations from Japan, Korea and South East Asia carried tribute to Peking as a sign of respect.

The point in introducing this Chinese perception of self greatness is not to suggest that rigid ethnocentrism is central to their contemporary world view.[2] Rather, it is to underline China's traditional leadership role that still finds meaning in the modern era when the PRC "finds it difficult to accept a disciple's role in world affairs" (Lovelace, 1971: 85). Contrary to any leadership aspirations China's impotency in the face of the western onslaught, a century of violent revolution and a host of internal upheavals since communist accesion in 1949 have left China comparatively weak in relation to the world's major powers. Moreover, with the collapse of the "Bandung Spirit" in the early 1960s, very few countries were willing to recognize any sort of Chinese superiority and a modern leadership role, at least among nation states, was impossible. Peking's alternative was to align with third world radicals--the revolutionaries--who although not in a major position of influence at least represented potential power. With the Thoughts of Chairman Mao and the wisdom of the Chinese revolutionary experience being distributed throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America, Peking again became a doctrinal leader. "Both Confucianism and Maoism place China in the role of ideological fountainhead or 'exemplar' at the centre of a group of less enlightened states" and it is evident how the revolutionary delegations that visited Peking throughout the 1960s resembled the "'Barabarians' who approached the cultural centre in ritualistic awe" (Solomon, 1968: 578). The reinforcement of this image of doctrinal stewardship would seem to be a powerful, if subtle, motive in Chinese foreign policy. Section II will more fully examine how this reinforcement is important in actual policy formulation.

A second traditional perception directly stems from China's unequalled longevity as a unified state, and involves a long term time perspective. Chinese leaders knew that invading armies would eventually melt away if they (or their successors) simply had the patience to wait them out. While rivals flourished and then floundered the Chinese remained. The immediate import of this time perspective is simply that goals need not be attained in "over-night" success, and it is no coincidence that the theory of protracted war developed in China. Of course, it is obvious that in many political situations rapid action is paramount to success, but in a nation that measures its history in millenia, longer term victories (the defeat of imperialism for instance) in line with the flow of history seem much more tangible and therefore more realistic than in the western world. Support of a very lengthy struggle is quite acceptable.

The third and final point is China's traditional concern with her physical security and the most effective means of its maintenance. Just as it was an immediate goal of emperors to create a buffer zone of neutral states around China, we see Peking pursuing a very similar policy in the modern era.[3] Using barbarians to fight barbarians is an old and sophisticated Chinese tactic, but pitting one's enemies against one another also bears the mark of common sense in maximizing one's own position while minimizing both risk and expenditure. It is apparent that support of foreign insurrections does indeed, in Chinese eyes, minimize the chance of foreign invasion. Therefore, traditional security concerns and the desire to have China's battles fought outside her borders would seem to suggest continued support of people's wars. However, the critical point is China's security and if a better method than diverting one's enemies could be found, it is very likely that the BRC would seize upon it.[4]

THE MARXIST-LENINIST INPUT

Probably much more directly important to the formation of Chinese foreign policy (and definitely more identifiable) are the conceptual schemae and ideological impact of Marxist-Leninst philosophy.[5] Considering the intensity and duration of the CCP's struggle, Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary life--"the Spirit of Yenan"--are unquestionably paramount to the manner in which China's leaders perceive their world and reason through problems. It is not surprising to see how "Mao views the world drama of today in the same manner as the Chinese revolution, but with the characters drawn to larger scale" (John Taylor, 1971: 15). Whether or not the Maoist outlook is indeed correct is rather irrelevant for the Chinese obviously act on it. It would be both difficult and unnecessary to describe the totality of this world view, but it is extremely valuable to introduce its major suppositions concerning national liberation struggles and the world situation in general.

The Theory of Contradictions

Mao's interpretation of contradiction involves the dialectics of both human and natural phenomena acting in a world of constant change, advanced by the continual posing and resolving of the contradicitions that are integral to all things; "opposites in contradicition unite as well as struggle with each other and thus impel all things to move and change". When this large scale model of change and ultimately progress, is translated into political terms it eventually terminates with the creation of a communist state. Therefore, every situation prior to the formation of this purely harmonious condition is defined by a series of contradictions which, however, are not equally important. Principal and secondary contradictions must be distinguished. For the purposes of policy formulation, this involves establishing a hierarchy of the most immediate contradictions as perceived by the leadership. The process is a critical one, for isolation of the principal contradiction reveals the nature of the "opponent" including its strengths and weaknesses, as well as circumscribes those elements which will make reliable allies in the elimination of the principal contradiction.

In international affairs, the PRC has recognized four long-standing major contradictions; between the socialist and imperialist camps, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries, between the so-called oppressed nations and imperialism, and between the imperialist countries themselves.[6] For fifteen years Peking proved reluctant to choose a principal contradiction from among the four, but did indicate a particular emphasis on certain geographical areas of the world (Asia, Africa and Latin America) by the use of a conceptual category; the 'concentration' or 'focus' of contradictions. This was the theoretical backdrop to the PRC's extended efforts in the Third World countries. However, reacting to events such as the American invasion of the Dominican Republic and the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the CCP felt it necessary to determine which of the four was most important. In 1965 P'eng Chen specifically declared that the principal contradiction was that between "the oppressed nations and imperialism headed by the United States." In concentrating on imperialist (American) opposition to revolution in the Third World, the struggles in these areas became Peking's number one priority in at least theoretical terms. Thus, support of people's war (agitation from the roots) became the mainspring of her foreign policy for at least the four following years, with "the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hanging on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas (Van Ness, 1971a: 27).[7]

The Enemy

It is manifestly apparent that in the years prior to the Cultural Revolution, the United States and its "lackeys" were the main enemy of revolutionary progress.[8]

> Countless facts show that U.S. imperialism is the biggest international exploiter and the main bulwark of colonialism. It is the prop of all reactionary forces and the main force of aggression and war. It is the most arrogant, most ferocious and most brutal of the aggressors that mankind has ever seen. It is the root of all evil for the Afro-Asian-Latin American Region (Editor Peking Review, January 21, 1966: 16).

The U.S. was seen to have fatal weaknesses however, especially in that it was totally reliant on foreign resources and expanding its influence so as to placate its own working class.[9] Therefore, a blow to the United

States helped the Third World free itself and also deprived the imperialists of the critical resources that it would need in future battles.

It is very important to note that the "American lackeys, puppets and agents" who headed many of the newly independent nations were also the enemy of the people. The existence of a nationalist government, even in the Third World, by no means precluded a people's war against imperialism. Simply having nation state status did not negate the imperialist relationship, but only made it a more subtle neo-colonialist one.

The Strategy - The United Front

The CCP has a very long acquaintance with the uses and misuses of the united front strategy. Although the Shanghai massacre of 1927 demonstrated the error of too strong a commitment or too deep an involvement, the united front technique ideally suits the PRC as a nation with large goals but limited means. It is designed to "win over all possible adherents, to neutralize those who will not come over...and insofar as possible, to isolate the enemy" (Van Ness, 1971a: 62). Based on an aversion to a common enemy, it very closely follows from the delineation of the principal contradiction in that, ideally, one's enemies and friends are readily defined. Further, by appealing to common interests Peking can create the impression of a new camp and can thereby reclaim its traditional leadership role as well as wield some impact in the international arena. In this sense, "once again the Middle Kingdom has become the centre of the way, and like the emperors of old, Mao Tse-tung is the highest source of both political and spiritual truth" (Schwartz, 1967: 240).

It follows that if a group or country supports the united front, it is a friend of the people and can do no wrong. "All wars waged by imperialism...are unjust; all communist and revolutionary wars are just (Rejai, 1969: 37). However, if the group collaborates with the enemy or is within the enemy bloc, it is labelled a "reactionary imperialist lackey", or more recently, a "modern revisionist". This "either-or" distinction is based on the particular reaction to the united front. If nations are either unwilling or unable to support the front as a united-front-from-above, those groups within the nation are urged to form a united-front-from-below. If the colonial governments or indeed the nationalist ones continued to be "agents of U.S. imperialism", alternate allies could be found to carry on the struggle.

> From the Chinese point of view the task of winning true 'national liberation' in such countries could not be performed by the officials in power, but had to depend on popular struggles against the government and perhaps on armed struggle by national liberation military forces (Van Ness, 1971a: 66).

The Inevitability and Desirability of Armed Struggle

According to the theory of class struggle, capitalist classes and imperialist powers are seen to be unwilling to surrender state power peacefully. With the capitalists refusing to abdicate authority and the working classes spurred on by the justness of their cause, the result is an antagonistic contradiction that can only be reconciled by force; "the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one" (Lin Piao 1965: 2). Therefore, for the resolution of this dramatic contradiction in which "countries want independence, nations want liberation and peoples want revolution" while the imperialists and their lackeys are rigidly resisting, armed struggle is inevitable.

The desirability of armed struggle springs from several sources. First, according to Maoist theory, in the process of mobilizing and indoctrinating the masses in the struggle to overthrow the enemy, organizational patterns, the participant's self-images and political awareness are all drastically modified. The result is the revolutionary man and the truly socialist state.[10] Following a successful people's war, the full scope of rural and urban life is changed with patterns of interaction and the entire body politic being irreversibly and favourably transformed. The critical element is the mobilization of the peasantry (or urban proletariat) and a people's war in its classical sense is primarily designed for precisely this goal. It can be safely argued that Chinese support of wars of national liberation is as much directed at the long term "awakening" of the countryside and the creation of true revolutionaries, as it is with the immediate concerns of seizing state power.

Second, by ultimately eliminating or at least severely weakening the imperialist enemy, armed struggle paves the way for a true and lasting peace. It must be remembered that antagonistic contradictions (those that can only be resolved by force) only exist when imperialism/capitalism exists and to remove this antagonism would insure peaceful development. Further, people's wars are desirable in that they make the likelihood of nuclear war less probable. In Third World insurgency a direct Sino-American military clash is less probable; correspondingly, local insurgencies are more likely to be fought with conventional, not nuclear armaments.

"Long Live the Victory of People's War"

"Probably no pronouncement by any other government during the 1960s elicited greater attention around the world from friend and foe alike" (Johnson, 1973: 29), than Lin Piao's article; "Long Live the Victory of People's War" (Lin, 1965). Ostensibly published to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Japan's defeat, it was clear that its message had more contemporary meaning. The exact nature of this meaning has been greatly debated. The Chinese themselves publicized it as--

> a comprehensive, systematic and profound analysis of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory and strategic concept of people's war and provides the revolutionary people of the world with a powerful ideological weapon in the fight against imperialism and modern revisionism (Chai, 1973: 346).

Franz Schurmann saw it as an indication "that Mao Tse-tung, despite his bitter antipathy to the Soviet Union, had not yet completely ruled out the possibility of collaboration with it, specifically over the case of Vietnam" (Schurmann 1969: 528). Samuel Griffith believed it to be "an out-and-out attack on the United States and, indeed, on all governments of the world striving for peaceful conditions in the world and stability with freedom at home" (1966: 12). Others have seen it as a less direct form of communication, including: a directive to Peking's top leadership concerning the conduct of China's defence strategy; a message to Hanoi indicating Peking's advocacy of less adventurist policies; as well as a warning to both the Russians and Americans that invasion of the PRC would be madness.[11] Few pieces of literature have been given such widely divergent interpretation and it is either a compliment to Lin or an indication of China's esoteric modes of communication that it could mean so many different things to so many different people.

Despite the plethora of possible meanings (indeed, Lin could have intended to say them all), several important points are presented in the article and it undoubtedly served as the most comprehensive statement of the Chinese theoretical position on support of people's wars in the period up to 1970. It was very definitely an attempt to cast the current international system in the same terms and conceptual categories that characterized the CCP's struggle for power. The actual actors have been altered-(United States replaces Japan as the imperialist aggressor, world united front substitutes for Mao's New Democracy and so forth[12]) but the basic motivations, and subsequent tactics, remain consistent:

> Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war has been proved by the long practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord with the objective laws of such wars and to be invincible. It has not only been valid for China, it is a great contribution to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world (Lin, 1965: 2).

It is very clear, that Chinese rhetoric at least in the middle 1960s, was both confident in the universality of the Maoist model and more than willing to support its use against the common enemy. Moreover, Lin's statement was a direct call for the united-front-from-below that would align the PRC with the Third World revolutionaries.

Of course this general theoretical perspective has immediate relevance to policy formulation, and it is well worthwhile to investigate briefly two of the questions that it raises that are of immediate importance to international relations; the issue of "revolution for export" versus revolutionary self-reliance, and second, the entire outlook on peaceful coexistence.

"Revolution for Export" vs. Revolutionary Self-Reliance

Although the term "revolution for export" has been repeatedly used in connection with Chinese foreign policy, conveying a very dramatic image of the diabolical manipulation of an historical situation, its exact meaning is rather uncertain. At one level it appears to be the attempt by the Chinese to introduce the strategies and tactics they found effective in their own struggle to Third World revolutionaries. At another, it involves external interference in the political structure of a particular region with the intent being an artificial, or at least induced revolutionary situation. In practical terms we are discussing the supply of arms, money and tactical advice to those groups engaged in insurgency. What, in theoretical terms, are the Chinese attempting to do?

It should be readily stressed that the PRC's policy statements have placed very heavy emphasis on revolutionary self-reliance. For instance, the first three paragraphs of Lin's article carry four references to the necessity to "adhere to the policy of self-reliance" and the message is very clear that "if one does not operate by one's own efforts...no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won." In one respect this accent on self-reliance might constitute a simple escape clause so that Peking can disclaim any responsibility for an unsuccessful people's war. History has proved that they can indeed fail. However, far more importantly, self-reliance is a very deep strain in the Chinese revolutionary experience; their victory in the face of a vastly superior army, and with little assistance from outside powers both spawned the theory of self-reliance and demonstrated its effectiveness.[13] Further, historical experience has given numerous examples of the counter-productivity of foreign intervention. "Thus, self-reliance is made the sine qua non and absolute proof of validity of the Chinese revolutionary model" (Lovelace, 1972: 95). The Chinese tradition has been the desired absence of foreign domination and assistance and I fully agree with Lovelace's observation "that the true role of Chinese 'people's war' support must be one of example and encouragement, but never, intervention or control" (1972: 95). Indeed, Lin notes that "foreign aid can only play a supplementary role" (1965: 2).

There seems to be an element of contradiction between the two concerns. On the one hand there is the commitment to proletarian internationalism; to assist Third World revolutionaries in their just struggle to "bury U.S. imperialism". However, there also exists the strong emphasis on self-reliance. The second section of this chapter will analyze how these two competing factors have been translated into actual policy, but it need be immediately noted that both concerns are deeply rooted in Mao Tse-tung thought, and, behaviour is based on elements of both. It is flexible in much the same way that the American desire to halt the spread of communism operates simultaneously with their well publicized verbal support for the principle of self-determination. The Chinese justification for the existence of both of these theoretical foundations is found in their interpretation of peaceful coexistence and the mechanics for their blending is found in the variant levels of diplomacy.

Peaceful Coexistence

Lin's article published in 1969 "On Relations With Foreign Countries" represents the most direct attempt to spell-out China's position on external interference and the nature of the proper relationship between states. Throughout Lin's exposition we see the familiar references to "fulfill proletarian international duty" and "to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations". And again we see statements urging self-reliance. The PRC's goal is

> to drive for peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence (19, emphasis added).

Further, it argues that "we have always held that the internal affairs of each country shall be settled by its own people" (20). Of course, the Chinese are walking a very fine line between support of insurgencies and the domestically despised but internationally expedient policy of peaceful coexistence. To distinguish themselves from the "revisionist" Soviets is critical, but to be overly radical is both dangerous and counterproductive to goal attainment in the international arena. The Chinese position is to argue that governments should act on the principle of peaceful coexistence, but the "people" must support revolutionary struggle.

The mechanism by which this two-pronged policy can be maintained is contained in the levels of diplomacy that parallel governmental, party and mass organizations within the PRC itself.[14] If the theory of Chinese foreign policy is examined as a single unit it appears manifestly hypocritical. But when the levels issue is introduced, it appears much more sophisticated and less contradictory than at first blush. At the state-to-state level (diplomacy from above), coexistence and peace are both desirable and possible. In this sense, and for several practical reasons,[15] the nations of the world have little to fear from overt Chinese expansion. However, at the party-to-party or people-to-people level every effort must be made to assist revolutionary comrades. Although in practice the distinction is often meaningless (a wounded Royal Thai soldier cares little if the bullet in his arm was supplied by the government of the PRC or by the CCP acting on its own behalf) in theory it is taken very seriously as is witnessed by the fact that Peking's leaders acting in their capacity as Party members rather than government officials proclaim the support for people's wars. Meanwhile the Chinese government can remain silent and often conducts "business as usual" with the state being denounced. As noted a bullet is still a bullet and it will be the task of the next section to assess how much aid is actually proffered. But in ideological terms, the different levels of interaction allow the PRC, at least in its own mind, to justify and explain its apparently contradictory theory. The actual legitimacy of this justification particularily to the outside world is highly questionable, but it need only be stated here that Chinese foreign policy is no more contradictory than that of any other major power. Elements of both intervention and self-determinism are present in the external affairs of any powerful state.

National Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

One further point that needs introduction and will become particularly important in explaining Peking's reaction to certain kinds of revolutionary movements, is that despite Peking's emphasis on revolutions, she does not support secessionist groups or regional break-ups (for example Biafra and Bangladesh). Where the United States can pursue a "two-Korea" a "two-Vietnam" or indeed a "two-China" policy, the Chinese will not and consistently stand against regional partition, for "on one side of their polemic the Chinese have made themselves the spokesman of the most orthodox doctrine of national sovereignty within the Communist world" (Schwartz, 1967; 239). This theoretical stance has ramifications in the type of revolution that Peking will support; it must be national. However, it also means that "the decision of any one given national party (including the CPSU) are binding only within the area under the jurisdiction of the party" (Schwartz, 1967: 239). Therefore, the theoretical perspective dictates that advice rather than orders be given to the insurgents and that any efforts to establish ideological hegemony must be dismissed. The historian remembers the period of the Warring Kingdoms, European attempts to fragment China as well as Moscow's early control of the CCP; so undoubtedly does Mao. There appears to be a very deep desire not to see the same policies forced on other revolutionary movements.

CONSTRAINTS ON CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Beyond the traditional and ideological factors discussed above, we must also examine some of the practical constraints on Chinese action that were predominant in the mid-1960s.

International Constraints

In the middle 1960s China's inadequacies vis a vis its rivals were most evident. China had neither the economic base nor the developed technology of the great powers. As an indication, four out of five Chinese still live in rural areas. The structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will be discussed later, but compared to the standing armies of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., it is significantly smaller and much more poorly equipped, and as Joffe notes, "The PLA still lags far behind the conventional armies of the great powers: (1973: 262). Further, despite recent developments, China's nuclear capacity was still in its infancy. The enemy might indeed be "paper tigers", but it is evident that in a direct military clash with either of the super-powers, the PRC would fare very poorly. As Mozingo and Robinson note (1965: 18), the very existence of the doctrine of people's war gives evidence that the Chinese themselves recognize their weakness: "since she [the PRC] is not able to defeat the United States frontally, she must wage war with the United States by proxy".

When "Long Live the Victory of People's War" was published in 1965, the PRC was literally encircled by hostile forces in both a military and political sense. The United States had ringed the Chinese mainland with air, land and sea bases as well as repeatedly blocking her entry into the United Nations. For their part, the Soviets maintained substantial forces along the northern and eastern borders of China and, in large measure, had cut China off from the remainder of the communist bloc nations, Albania being the only exception. The point of noting this geographical encirclement and ideological excommunication is not to place blame for the PRC's often radical behaviour; instead it is designed to demonstrate that China did not have access to the normal means by which a large power might exercise its influence. It had few allies and many enemies, but more importantly lacked the recognition that would allow her future advancement. With her economic, and military weapons effectively counter-balanced by American and Soviet strength, clearly an alternate strategy for asserting its influence was needed.Support for Third

World revolution was precisely such a strategy.[17]

Domestic Constraints

In addition to the external pressures outlined above, China's historical and economic situation have placed a number of constraints on her action. A rapidly expanding population, little industrialization and the tremendous organizational difficulties associated with operating so large a country have been extensively documented in the past. One point that remained obscure until the last decade was China's military capability and the internal structure of the PLA. While it is much less powerful than either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., it is overwhelming when compared to its immediate Asian neighbours. The question then arises; why is the PLA not employed as a means of influence? The answer is based on three considerations. First, alliance pacts guarantee immediate American reprisal. Second, recent studies have shown that the PLA's organization and equipment to date have made impossible extensive operations beyond her own borders.

> Not only is Peking lacking in comparative military capabilities, but also it has chosen not to invest its scarce resources or to organize its military forces in a manner appropriate for offensive military action. In fact, China today has no real offensive capability in the sense of being able to launch an effective attack on a major power (Van Ness, 1971a: 72-73).

Finally, it can also be seen that even without threat of American reprisal and/or the PLA's present organizational and material structure, Maoist philosophy itself acts as a constraint on direct military intervention.

Overall, the PRC is "relatively weak, poor and isolated" (Robinson, 1969: 73). With this being the case and particularily considering the opposition it receives from the U.S. and U.S.S.R., it is not surprising that Peking had been unable or unwilling to fashion a very direct impact on the international situation by using the tactics available to the super-powers. Of course, China's power is growing and in future it will possess more of the economic, political and military leverage that constitute traditional modes of influence. The question of to what uses they might ultimately apply this strength will be central to a conclusive analysis of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. However, in the middle and late 1960s, both external and internal constraints made it necessary for Peking to use less direct methods of influencing the international community and individual states. A readily available and ideologically acceptable alternative was support of foreign revolutionaries.

SECTION II CHINESE SUPPORT OF PEOPLE'S WARS IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1965 AND 1970

The first section of this chapter presented the traditional and theoretical (ideological) concerns that are pertinent to Peking's support for people's wars. However, Donald Zagoria is quite correct in arguing that "while such historical and cultural factors are unquestionably necessary to a full understanding of politics in contemporary

China, they are by themselves inadequate to explain specific political development" (1968: 258). To fill this gap this section will analyze the nature, extent and motivations of Peking's assistance to insurgents in the pre-Cultural Revolution period.

In examining the mechanics of the support of people's wars, the lions share of this section will rely heavily on Van Ness' outline and findings. While this is the case the discussion of the functions of people's war will also incorporate the ideas of a number of scholars. Information from some of the regional studies will be included, but only when it illustrates some larger principle that is generalizable to this broader overview. This discussion will set out a general overview of the mechanisms and history of Peking's support for foreign insurgencies that is valuable in itself but also that aids in the prediction of future behaviour. "In order to understand the present function of revolutionary sponsorship in [PRC] foreign relationships, it is necessary to discuss the role which such support has previously performed for Peking" (Lovelace, 1972: 94). In short, my goal is to provide an overview of the patterns of PRC's assistance to revolutionary movements on the basis of individual instances, without examining those instances in detail.

THE INSTRUMENT

It should be stressed that despite Peking's theoretical support of all people's wars, in practice the

Chinese have been very selective in endorsing any specific revolution. As Van Ness observed, even during 1965, a high-point of the doctrine,"Peking endorsed revolutionary struggles in only 23 of a possible total of some 120 independent and non-independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America" (1971: 82). With this in mind, three questions become immediately important: First, what types of public endorsement does Peking extend; second, insofar as information is available, what was the nature and extent of any material aid given to revolutionary movements; and third, what selection criteria seemed to be operating in choosing which groups to endorse?

Public Endorsement

Peking's public support of revolutionary insurgency can be broken into two broad categories; implicit and explicit. Implicit endorsements have involved a mass rally or account in the Chinese media that supports the "people" of a particular country and does not specify a particular leading group. Most often it took the form of a reprint of the political programs of indigenous revolutionary groups, the promulgation of news concerning the progress and nature of the struggle in the particular country, or finally, the publication of maps that designated specific areas as the locations of armed struggle. In itself an implicit endorsement is of little importance to either the guerilla movement or the counter-insurgent. Where it is significant is that "at the very least there is a strong implication of official endorsement" (Van Ness, 1971a: 86) and it therefore might qualify for aid. The probable reason for the existence of this category is twofold. First, it allows the Chinese to maintain an aura of proletarian internationalism while at the same time not endangering the chances of a fledgling guerilla movement or risking direct Chinese involvement in a failure.[1] Second, it is a very useful tool for demonstrating to the Chinese masses that their country is unquestionably in the revolutionary vanguard. The need, even necessity, for maintaining the "Spirit of Yenan" has had tremendous impact on domestic politics in the PRC. "With Syrians and Argentines proclaiming the relevance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung for solving their own domestic problems, who among the Chinese masses is to doubt that similar policies are not appropriate to China" (Solomon, 1968: 578). Solomon goes on to argue that general support of people's wars is "the embodiment of the Lin-Mao approach to placing foreign relations in the service of China's domestic political process" (578). This argument will be pursued more fully at the end of this section, but for the present it can be noted that endorsement of any sort is made public to the Chinese masses as well as to the world-at-large, and thereby is intended to have both domestic and international impact.

Explicit endorsements have been proclaimed either in the name of the Chinese people or the CCP and have involved a direct appeal for the overthrow of imperialism and/or a specific regime. The most powerful statements of this type have been made by Mao himself and have been accompanied by mass demonstrations focusing on revolutionary solidarity. Examples are the speeches by Mao condemning the U.S. actions in Vietnam, the Congo and the Dominican Republic.[2] More often, lesser Party officials have penned the statements circulated by the press, and although they have been distributed around the world, they have received only a fraction of the publicity within China that a declaration by Mao warrants. In contrast to an implicit endorsement, the explicit have only been issued when the revolutionary group supported has been in existence for a considerable period and is likely to succeed, or in cases where American intervention is direct as in Vietnam.

Van Ness' analysis of Peking's endorsements of revolutions in 1965 revealed a number of very important points. First, Peking's major preoccupation was with Asian revolutionary movements, and Vietnam in particular. Because Asia is geographically, historically and economically tied to China, this concern comes of little surprise. "While the Chinese revolution is peculiar to China, the history from which it has emerged and the thought which has guided it bear marked similarities to the history and political thought of much of the rest of Asia" (Carino, 1969: 88). Of course, Asia has particular significance for although the PRC has no formal equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine, the rest of the continent is of vital importance to her security. Any effort to overthrow an existing regime and replace it with a leadership sympathetic to Peking is particularily welcomed when it helps guarantee Chinese security and her traditional zone of influence. This concern for Asia is discussed by William Hinton who argues that support of people's wars _outside_ Asia is "intended among other things to distract the United States and perhaps the Soviet Union as well, from the immediate periphery of China and so reduce the risk and obstacle to Chinese policy in Asia (1972: 256). China's interests undoubtedly extend beyond the continent and the PRC has "insisted on acting as a world power in at least the political sense" (Hinton, 1972: 232). Nevertheless, a simple look at the map reveals the importance of Asia to China and _vice versa_, and even if one argues the question of priority, the number of people's wars explicitly endorsed in Asia was not surprisingly larger than the remainder of the world combined.

Second, as suggested earlier, Peking only endorsed those insurgencies that had achieved a significant level of armed activity. For example, the insurgency in the hills of Haiti was not explicitly endorsed as the likelihood of its survival was extremely remote.[3] Third, as theory would suggest, struggles in colonies were endorsed even though Portugal did not receive even a fraction of the criticism that the United States' "imperialists" did. Fourth and finally, the level of doctrinal orthodoxy required was minimal. Some sign was needed that the movement be leftist, but insistence on a rigid Maoist line or even a strictly Marxist one was unimportant in the mid-1960s. Groups varying from the nationalist FLN in Algeria to the orthodox Viet Cong were endorsed.

As was argued in the introduction to this paper, endorsement in itself is of critical importance to understanding people's war as an element of Chinese foreign policy. It need only be added here that public endorsement was a first step to the extension of material aid. Public support was a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite to more tangible material aid.

Material Assistance

Because the Chinese press only rarely reveals the amount of Peking's aid to either governments or insurgents, and because the Western media very likely overestimate it, ascertaining the extent of Peking's assistance to people's wars is extremely difficult. Whereas rhetorical support appears to be a minimum ideological duty, the doctrine of self-reliance gives considerable lee-way in the amount of material aid that will actually be provided. Support has varied from the tens of millions of dollars poured into Vietnam each year, to almost token gestures, as was demonstrated in Peking's assistance to an abortive Kerala uprising in November 1968 which consisted of £50 and a large supply of "big character" posters of Mao's quotations. The interesting point is that none of the Keralas could read the posterswhich were all in Chinese.[4] Van Ness estimates Peking's overall expenditure to be clearly over one hundred million dollars per year. Although this amount would appear to be "bargain-basement" as compared to the United States' billion dollar plus annual budget for counter-insurgency, it is most significant considering the limited funds needed to maintain guerilla operations and the comparatively small size of the PRC's available resources.

Aid is provided in several forms. First, public endorsements in themselves serve to give the revolutionaries some form of recognition and encouragement. It can be remembered how earnestly Che appealed to Castro to make the Bolivian struggle public. Although "international" recognition is of limited value, it does appear to ease the spiritual isolation and loneliness of the guerilla. Second, on several occasions and particularly for their Asian comrades, the Chinese have allowed rebels to train within the PRC (Burmese troops from 1965-1968) or, more commonly, have sent instructors to the front for on-the-spot training (Zambia). Third, the PRC has provided arms that vary from light weapons (Palestine) to aircraft and tanks (Vietnam). Fourth, in the case of several African countries they have allowed the use of their embassy for harbouring wanted rebels and for distributing weapons

(Congo). Fifth, they were more than willing to provide advice on political and military strategy. Information on topics ranging from terror andassassination--"the tapestry of violence"--to party building and canal construction is available from Chinese cadres. It should be stressed that aside from Korea and in a limited way, Vietnam,[5] Chinese troops have never been committed to revolutionary groups outside of China. This policy is justified by the doctrine of self-reliance, but it is evidently different from the Cuban tradition of sending cadres abroad (Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela) with the intention of participating in and leading foreign revolutions. It also stands in marked contrast to Soviet actions supporting people's movements in the middle 1940s. It therefore becomes apparent that something more than the realities of power politics restrain China's PLA. It is very likely that Maoist ideology is the basis of this restraint.

Sixth and finally, the most significant form of support was the availability of the Chinese propaganda machine. The PRC possesses more than adequate means for distributing its revolutionary message around the world. Radio broadcasts in five Chinese dialects and twenty-three other languages[6], printed material including inexpensive books and colorful magazines, travelling entertainers and cultural exchanges spread Maoist ideology to those willing to listen. The importance of this message should not be underestimated. Leaders of people's movements can readily receive theoretical advice, encouragement and practical tactical counsel, thereby strengthening both their commitment and ability. Peasants, workers and all those "oppressed" hear both the injustices of their present system and the outline of a better one that can replace it. The power of ideas and alternatives is immeasurable, and the communications network that Peking can provide to an endorsed revolution was an extremely puissant weapon. Indeed, support of this nature characterizes the PRC's entire approach to people's war: arouse the masses and encourage them to pursue their own struggle and victory.

TARGETS FOR REVOLUTION

The final question that must be explored (probably the most important for investigating the role of support of people's war *vis à vis* general Chinese foreign policy) is: On what criteria did Peking choose to support one revolution while not supporting others? An immediate reaction is to look at the theory of people's war as outlined in the first section of this paper. However, as Van Ness notes, "the Maoist concepts of feudalism and imperialism do not explain why Peking chose certain countries as TRs [targets for revolution] and rejected others" (1971a: 166). In cases of a sustained anti-colonial insurgency in a non-independent (colonial) area such as Aden, Oman, Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, the Chinese have little alternative but to support it.

However, the majority of instances do not involve such overt colonialism and Van Ness could find no satisfactory explanation for Peking's endorsements in Marxist-Leninist or even Maoist ideology. This is not to say that a study of Maoist theory is useless, but rather to argue that there is enough "flexibility" in the outlook to support a number of different forms of behaviour. A knowledge of their conceptualization and world view is critical to an understanding of their categorization of reality, but as with any major state, behaviour is consistently tempered by the considerations of national interest.

Van Ness provides an alternate explanation; his state thesis which argues that:

> The primary factor in Peking's decision is the policy pursued by the government of a particular country with respect to the People's Republic of China. The liklihood of the country's being endorsed as a TR varies according to important aspects of its governments relative official friendliness or hostility towards Peking (1971a: 169).

After constructing measures of "official friendliness" and "official hostility"[7], he analyzed the pattern of endorsements and discovered that his hypothesis held true.[8] It therefore appears that Peking was endorsing revolutions partly on the basis of internal conditions within the state (there did have to be an active insurrection, it did have to have a good chance for survival, and so forth), but of equal importance was the manner in which the host country dealt with the PRC. This raises several critical points concerning the function of support for people's war.

First, selecting a nation as a TR was a definite way of communicating Peking's displeasure with that particular state. Portugal for one seemed sensitive to the message for as their foreign minister was quoted as saying: "There are no serious reasons for not recognizing Peking, and many reasons for doing so" (Van Ness, 1971a: 177, emphasis added). Fear of people's war could be used to coerce states and thereby act as a means of influence. Second, in this way assistance to revolutions can be seen as serving China's own national interest as well as her perceived international responsibility. Revolutionaries could be helped while Peking was at the same time placed in control of a very real, albeit limited, coercive weapon. The degree of national interest as compared to Marxist-Leninist theory inherent in the policy is difficult to define. Considering the lack of viable alternatives available to the PRC, whether or not revolution was endorsed because it ultimately advanced Chinese interests or global revolutionary ones, any move to the left was in Peking's favour. A blow to U.S. "imperialism" or its "lackeys" helped resolve the "principal contradiction" to the benefit of both the insurgents and the PRC. Van Ness makes reference to this situation in noting that,

> Chinese foreign policy, like the foreign policy of many states was first and foremost concerned with the preservation and security of the state and the development of its power and prestige, be it for national or ideological reasons, or for both" (Van Ness, 1971a: 197).

The point that needs emphasis is that the interests of the

Chinese state came before those of the world revolutionaries outside the PRC. Support of people's wars was not a simple utopian exercise, but rather was a very pragmatic attempt to satisfy both national and international concerns. In the period prior to the Cultural Revolution, the two coincided and therefore both the Chinese and the insurgents profited.

One further point indicates that Peking's "revolutionary ecumenicism" might have been more egotistical than otherwise suspected. It appears rather clear that the PRC was not particularly interested in actually overthrowing her enemies. The birth of a leftist, pro-Peking regime would have been welcomed, but the Chinese very likely knew that the support they lent would be insufficient to topple an established government. After a detailed examination of the Thai-Chinese relationship during this period, Daniel Lovelace concludes that people's war "was aimed more at obtaining psychological and ideological benefit for the PRC than at severely threatening the existence of the Royal Thai government" (1971: 66). Further, Larkin notes that "there is no convincing evidence that Peking's revolutions are a major threat to indigenous African political life" (1972: 5-6). Of course, both are comments on the restricted level of Chinese assistance dictated by the doctrine of self-reliance as well as Peking's limited resources. However, more importantly they again demonstrate that support of people's wars served interests in China at least as much as those of the revolutionaries.

We can also note that the PRC's refusal to endorse revolutions in countries that acted positively towards it reflects a desire to maintain the recognition, economic advantages and acceptance that a friendly relationship entails. This clearly suggests that China does in fact have some stake in the international system that it does not wish to lose. The fact that she refused to jeopardize this recognition demonstrates that it was very important to her and it therefore becomes a very real question as to whether revolutionary leadership or international recognition would be her ultimate goal. Carried to its logical conclusion the question might indeed be asked if support of people's war was propagated to create a bargaining tool to exchange for acceptance into the world community.[9] However, as long as China was isolated these questions were moot because only one real strategy was afforded her. In the event that this isolation would disappear, Peking's attitude on endorsement would most definitely have to be reexamined, and indeed this will be found to be the situation in the modern period.

FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPPORT OF PEOPLE'S WARS

The critical question pursued this far concerns the function that support of people's wars has had in Chinese foreign policy up to the Cultural Revolution period. Several parts of the answer have been introduced throughout the chapter, but because of the critical nature of the question, a brief summary is valuable. Without making any attempt to arrange these functions in a hierarchy of importance (this will be done after the impact of the Cultural Revolution has been assessed), seven main functions can be isolated.

1) Support of people's wars was consistent with the domestic political values that the CCP was attempting to instill (or refurbish) in the local Chinese population. The essential "red" element that is so integral to Mao's mass line places primary emphasis on the revolutionary spirit of the masses that is the key to victory over any problem or enemy. Projected into foreign policy in the middle of the 1960s, this "Spirit of Yenan" yielded a radical approach to world affairs (attempts to overthrow other governments was simply not playing by the accepted rules) and was combined with what would seem to be a genuine desire to see revolutionary activity succeed. Further, if the Maoist revolutionary model could find favour in other countries it would reinforce Mao's image as a great leader, and equally importantly serve as proof of Communist success in rebuilding China's lost preeminence. Just as American belief in democracy is buttressed by the exportability and ultimately the universality of the theory of democracy, so did China seek demonstration of its world view for both a domestic and international audience. If one views the PRC as "totalitarian" the need to provide evidence of the value of their policies becomes even more important.

2) Active support of people's wars provided the Chinese with an ideological axe that could be used in attacking the Soviet "revisionists". Of course, this concern became particularly acute during the Cultural Revolution, but even in the 1965-1966 period the Chinese were definitely interested in demonstrating their position as the true leader of the "revolutionary camp". In this sense, action spoke more loudly than words.

3) By helping Third World revolutions the PRC could maintain pressure on American imperialism and thereby increase her physical security. Knowing full well that the United States would rush to the aid of any regime attacked by "communism", support of local insurgents was an inexpensive and comparatively riskless method of striking back at its principal enemy. One viewpoint is that

> the strategic concept...underlying 'people's war' was to obtain a maximum dispersal and attrition of American strength with a minimum commitment of China's own power and without ever risking a direct military clash between Chinese and American forces" (Lowenthal, 1968: 10).

Moreover, support of Asian insurgency could help guarantee Chinese territorial security by creating a buffer zone of friendly forces around her borders. In another sense, according to their world view, support of any insurgency, was beneficial, for:

> ...by involving the United States in numerous uprisings, they would be able to strain its resources and weaken its total strength; this would force the United States to reduce its presence in the area surrounding China (Joffe, 1973: 272).

Even though this method of "self-defence" was rather indirect, it must be stressed that it was one of the very view paths open to the Chinese.

4) The Chinese saw people's wars as helping develop a world wide revolutionary consciousness. By publicly endorsing insurgent activity, the message of proletarian internationalism and the necessity of armed struggle could ~~be effectively propagated.~~ Through this message they could readily disparage American intervention and as already noted, challenge the Soviet Union "as the true leader of the world revolution" (Joffe, 1973: 272). Undoubtedly, there was also a very real desire to see their "comrades" succeed and this could only be accomplished if the countryside of the world was mobilized.

5) Although very few insurgencies had a good chance of succeeding, support of people's wars had potential value in the event of an unexpected victory. The assistance granted by Peking could pay handsome dividends in post-liberation dealings.

6) By endorsing and assisting revolution and calling for a united front, Peking could create a new camp of which she could become the leader. As unquestionably the largest and most successful example of people's war, the PRC had considerable opportunity to champion the causes of the Third World's revolutionaries. Despite the relative impotency of its radical followers, the revolutionary banner held high in Peking was reminiscent of the era

when indeed China was the Middle Kingdom, and thereby reinforced China's historical pride.

7) Finally, as has been repeatedly noted, support or non-support of people's wars was a very real technique in influencing the behaviour of other states. Although the impact of this indirect coercion was comparatively weak, considering Peking's limited alternatives any pressure it could exert was important.

SECTION III THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Although the assignment of dates to movements and eras is at best approximate, support of people's wars, and moreover Chinese international behaviour, can be broken into three periods: first, the early years of 1962 to late 1966; second, the period of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath that lasted from late 1966 to 1970; and third, the contemporary period from 1970 to the present.[1] Up to this point, this chapter has outlined the theory and mechanics as well as the international and domestic conditions that were associated with assistance to national liberation struggles throughout the "early" period. It was repeatedly stressed that this support was the product of external and internal factors that shaped China's world view as well as her strategic alternatives. However, the massive convulsions of the Cultural Revolution so affected the PRC's international and domestic situation that it is imperative to assess the impact of these two chaotic years if an accurate historical perspective on contemporary affairs is to be achieved.

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION[2]

There is really no question that, at least temporarily, the Cultural Revolution which lasted from the middle of 1966 to early 1968 affected almost every aspect of the PRC's international and domestic politics. My immediate concern is neither the history nor the theoretical undercurrents of this massive struggle.[3] Instead, this section will specifically explore the changes it brought about in the nation's foreign policy, particularly the alterations that it caused in the patterns and priorities of Chinese support for people's wars. Although the precise details of the numerous phases and events of the period will probably never be known, several major factors of this complex and often confusing period can be isolated.

Red Guard Diplomacy

Melvin Gurtov's observation that Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution "was in a state of suspended animation" (1969: 100) strongly suggests that foreign policy *per se* was not an initiating factor in the outbreak of the struggle. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was to become very much involved with the course of events before the period was finished. Both ideological and immensely practical forces were responsible for this situation. It should first be stressed that the *raison d'etre* of the Cultural Revolution involved ideological issues and despite periodic fluctuations, the Red Guards were the most active and potent forces in the actual battles that occurred. These youthful supporters of Mao's revolutionary line were the shock troops of the attack on the rightist elements and their ardent and often impetuous actions characterized much of Chinese politics in this period. Combined with top level Politburo support (particularly Mao, Chiang Ching and Lin Piao), leftist elements strongly influenced policies within the MFA. All of China's diplomats were recalled for "retraining" and students studying abroad were strongly encouraged to actively promote the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Indeed, the Red Guards released a "wave of hysterical xenophobia and ehtnocentrism...which found its chief expression in the unparalleled exultation of Mao and his thoughts" (Yahuda, 1968: 105). At a practical level Red Guard pressure became extremely direct and at one point actually involved a takeover of the MFA. It was by no means surprising that long-time diplomats who had been fashioning Chinese foreign policy for several years were either replaced, subdued or silenced by the political climate the Red Guards had generated.[4]

The impact of these circumstances on actual policy was dramatic. Carefully cultivated foreign friends such as Cambodia were attacked by the Chinese press as "tools" of hostile enemies. Maoist activists incited riots and strikes in Macao and Hong Kong, as well as creating demonstrations in a number of countries (Ceylon, Nepal, Britain, Switzerland, Algeria and Sweden) that severely alienated the governments involved. Soviet and East European sailors were incarcerated in Shanghai by Red Guards for failure to wear Mao badges. The burning of the British embassy in Peking was the "high point" of Red Guard diplomacy and it was evident that by early 1968 "Peking appeared to be literally at odds with the world" (Van Ness, 1971a: 205).

It was clear that such occurrances could not be allowed to continue and combined with a general moderation of the entire militant movement administered by the PLA, order began to be restored late 1967. The Cultural Revolution carried on within China, but in the latter months of 1967 the peak influence of the domestic struggle on Chinese international relations had passed. For purposes of understanding support of people's wars, two critical forces emerged during the chaotic period up to August 1967; first, an ideological sensitization of the entire policy making apparatus; and second, a significant heightening of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Both were to have tremendous impact on Chinese foreign policy in the following years.

Ideological Sensitization

The very nature of the Cultural Revolution placed critical emphasis on theoretical considerations. Questions of ideological purity and the desire to root out "revisionists" and "capitalist roaders" were some of the main objectives of the entire campaign. Officials rose and fell on the basis of their ideological alignment and both the wall posters and more traditional media gave extensive coverage to points of theory. Moreover, the struggle between competing factions was waged in schools and Party committees using ideas and polemic as principle weapons.[5] Considering the intensity of the debate, (at least in the cities) the result was an ideological sensitization that raised doctrinal questions to a level of critical importance in the operation of the CCP and government.

An equally important outcome was the reaffirmation of Mao Tse-tung as the leader of the nation and more importantly the thought of Mao as the unquestioned blueprint of Chinese development. "Before the Cultural Revolution, The Thought of Mao Tse-tung always followed Marxism-Leninism as a derivative system; subsequently it became the dominant theme with Marxism-Leninism remaining a distant echo" (Schwartz, 1968: 511). This change was important in that, at least in domestic politics, the revolutionary values--"The Spirit of Yenan"--would be reemphasized and Mao's mass line would guide Party organization and developmental strategy for at least the immediate future.

Heightening of Sino-Soviet Tensions

Tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC had been in evidence long before the outbreak of the Cultural

Revolution. The Chinese denouncements of "Khrushchev Revisionism" began in 1959 and increased in intensity and frequency until his overthrow in 1964, at which time a new campaign was launched against "Khrushchev Revisionism Without Khrushchev". This polemic continued into the Cultural Revolution. However, the events of this tumultuous period witnessed a Chinese reassessment of the U.S.S.R. and combined with certain strategic considerations and Chinese anxiety over the American-Soviet detente, China began to view the Soviets with even increased suspicion. There are several reasons why this took place. First, Maoists struggling to gain tactical advantage over "rightist" opponents found great value in revealing the weaknesses of the Soviet system and associating their position with the "Khrushchev revisionists". Although this attack was purely rhetorical it did have the effect of reinforcing negative feelings about the Soviet Union. The Soviets became a very handy model of a successful bourgeois counter-revolution that could never be allowed to take root in China. Second, events such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia must have made Peking extremely wary of Soviet intentions concerning the PRC's ideological perversity. Third, the nationalist upsurge generated by the Cultural Revolution placed old questions of unfair border settlements and territorial disputes in a new light. There are reported instances of Red Guard extremists forcing Chinese peasants across the border into Soviet areas in order to create incidents that might further hostilities. Although the official Chinese leadership probably had nothing to do with these activities, this type of incident still heightened antagonisms between the two nations. Fourth, as a response to rough treatment of Embassy personnel and as a counter to Red Guard border activities, the Soviets reinforced their troops all along the Chinese frontier and thereby further escalated the uneasy atmosphere.

In short, long term strategic concerns were combined with a largely expanded theoretical intolerance that further deepened the Sino-Soviet controversy. It was evident to the Chinese that the Russians were indeed a major threat to their security. It is easy to see how Chou found "the Soviet Union with its massive conventional power (about 40 divisions) poised near China's borders, a more appropriate and useful threat than the United States, whose threat to China had been largely nuclear" (Hinton, 1972: 287). In theoretical terms U.S. imperialism still represented the principal contradiction, but there was no question that "the U.S.S.R. replaced the United States as China's Public Enemy Number One, and revisionism superseded imperialism as the primary issue around which both China's domestic and foreign policies revolved" (Van Ness, 1971a: 213). It appears that questions of consolidating the revolution and avoiding the pitfalls of capitalist restoration had replaced Peking's earlier concern with fostering new revolutions as its primary objective. But let us directly look at the impact of the Cultural Revolution on support of people's wars.

9

CHANGES IN PATTERNS OF SUPPORT

Van Ness indicates that the Cultural Revolution precipitated three main changes in Peking's assistance to foreign revolutions, and it should be noted that all three directly parallel domestic Chinese policy considerations.

1) Previously "safe" countries that had never been designated a TR suddenly faced a hostile Peking—even though they indicated no change in their official friendliness towards China. Support of insurgency in Burma proved to be the paradigm case,[6] but India, Indonesia, Israel, Cameroon and Ecuador were also endorsed as targets of people's wars. As Van Ness discovered,

> foreign governments which in earlier years had enjoyed relatively normal diplomatic relations with Peking were, during 1967, endorsed as TRs in spite of apparently sincere attempts by their governments to maintain friendly ties with China (Van Ness, 1971a: 227).

At one level, this suggests that the Chinese view of "acceptable behaviour" had been modified. But it also reflected a new concern; Peking's sensitivity to the rough treatment afforded the Chinese students who actively propagated the Thoughts of Mao in foreign countries. Considering the influence Red Guard pressure wielded in the MFA at that time, this "punishment" of errant governments comes as little of a surprise. However, it is less obvious that the long-time diplomats who had previously determined the choices of TRs had little to do with the decision. It would seem inconceivable that experienced decision-makers would not have recognized the dangers and hypocricies that support of their radical foreign students yielded. Losing international influence in countries that had in past shown some sympathy to their cause was the price of the outburst.

2) The central goal of support for insurgencies seems to have changed. Whereas before the Cultural Revolution, people's war was primarily a tactic to "undermine the pro-Western orientations of world politics...since the Cultural Revolution, the Maoists seemed to become largely preoccupied with replication of the Chinese model" (Van Ness, 1971a: 227). This change in emphasis is worthy of note for it revealed that the demonstration of the universality of the Maoist model was taking precedence over genuine proletarian internationalism. Considering the intensity of the struggle at home, this emphasis was most understandable.

3) Closely associated to this second point was the fact that the types of revolutionary organizations recognized in the Chinese media grew more restricted.[7]

> Being successfully revolutionary was not enough; foreign revolutionary movements had also to proclaim their identification with the strategy and general ideology of Chairman Mao in order to receive much attention from the Chinese press (Van Ness, 1971a: 228).

Guevera's Bolivian insurgency in 1967 was only briefly mentioned almost certainly due to Chinese sensitivity to questions of ideological orthodoxy during this period. Challenges to Maoist doctrine, whether they were made by the Soviets or fledgling guerilla movements, were scarcely welcomed in Peking during the Cultural Revolution.

Correspondingly, there also existed the first signs that Peking's assistance to a particular movement was as much dependent on the groups anti-Soviet stand as it was on its anti-imperialist one. The Sino-Soviet controversy had become a very real issue in selecting which revolutions to endorse.

THE 1968 AND 1969 PERIOD

Chinese foreign policy in the two years immediately following the Cultural Revolution can best be analyzed as an attempt to restore the balance that had been shattered in the previous period. Several advances in this direction were made. First, Chou En-lai was able to ease relations with some of the Third World countries that had been attacked during the hottest months of the Cultural Revolution and particularly in the cases of Cambodia and Burma was able to reintroduce some elements of a "good-neighbour" policy. Second, ambassadors were reinstated in almost all of the countries from which they had been withdrawn. Notable exceptions were Indonesia and India. Third, tentative steps were taken by several countries (including Canada) to establish diplomatic relations and although these efforts did not blossom for another two years, the seeds of recognition were sewn. This period was also the beginning of a serious Chinese bid to join the United Nations which however was not successfully completed until October of 1971.

Two new factors were also at work. On the negative side, after the Ussuri river incidents of 1969, Soviet-Chinese relations hit an all time low and there was a very good chance that open warfare would break out at any time. Threats of invasion or the destruction of China's nuclear installation were aimed at the PRC in a Soviet attempt to initiate formal talks on the border problem. The border issue was by no means solved at these talks and the Sino-Soviet controversy continued as a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy. On a more positive note, several steps were taken to initiate relations with the United States, probably stemming from a very great fear of too strong a Soviet-American detente that would allow the Russians a free hand in dealing with the PRC. Any "normalization" of relations between the Americans and Chinese was further assisted by the fact that the U.S. intended to de-escalate the Vietnam conflict and in essence reduce its Asian presence. In any case, the late 1960s saw the initial efforts at Sino-American rapprochment that would soon make possible Nixon's historic visit to the PRC.

Despite these tentative advances towards normalization, at least the Peking press continued support of a limited number of people's wars. Although Van Ness' analysis only goes as far as 1967, he gives no indication that the "aftermath" period (1969-70) saw a significant reduction in the number of endorsed revolutions. It very much appeared that Peking was again following the two-pronged approach that had been in evidence in the early 1960s.

Options for both diplomacy from above and below were kept open. Indeed, the period was definitely one of transition from the revolutionary fervour of the Cultural Revolution to a more normalized period of expanded international recognition. As of early 1970 it was impossible to tell which force would predominate.

CONCLUSION

In concluding this section and chapter, several points that relate to the impact of the Cultural Revolution as well as to the general historical perspective should be reemphasized.

1) Considering the internal turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, the more extreme turns of Red Guard diplomacy are better analyzed as impulsive, ideological bursts than indications of a new trend. Gurtov is correct in arguing that:

> Those instances in which the Revolution had deleterious consequences for China's foreign policy might be characterized as aberrant episodes rather than as reflections of a persistent or prominent new strand in China's foreign policy line (1968: 103).

The fact that veteran diplomats had little to do with the more radical positions Peking assumed strongly indicates the "spontaneity" of the era. In this sense, endorsements of revolutions in more or less friendly countries (a tactic unknown before the Cultural Revolution) could be expected to stop as Red Guard influence in the MFA declined. This in fact is what happened as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.

Nevertheless, the Cultural Revolution did unleash (or strengthen) two forces that were to be the mainsprings of contemporary foreign policy; the rapprochement with the United States and the further escalation of Sino-Soviet hostilities. The two factors are undoubtedly connected in that Chinese fear of Soviet attack was a very strong determinant in Chinese response to friendly overtures from the West. Moreover, the United States decision to reduce its military role in Asia allowed a real "warming" of relations. Moves toward increased "friendliness" were not long in following.[7]

2) By early 1970 it was extremely difficult to ascertain the Chinese position on support of Third World insurgency. 1968 and 1969 had undoubtedly been a transition period but due to the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution it was difficult to see just where the transition was leading. At that time the Sino-American friendship was still only a possibility (it only began to take shape two years later with President Nixon's visit) and China's international status was much the same as it had been in 1965; few allies, little international recognition, and no formal acceptance into the world community. It is not surprising that rhetorical support for people's wars continued at a pace only slightly lower than at the peak of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, on May 20, 1970, Mao made a statement "expressing continued support for the communist war effort in Indochina"

and even as much as a year later (May 20, 1971) all of Pekings newspapers published a lengthy article praising the success of revolutionary movements in Burma, Thailand, the Phillipines, Malaysia and North Borneo. Further, the attack on the "Soviet Cultural Imperialists" was stepped up so that Peking's position looked as militantly revolutionary as ever.

In any case, support of people's wars continued unabated into the early 1970s. Nevertheless, this revolutionary "pose" belied a number of other considerations that would later become important in Peking's emergence into the world community. It must be stressed that assistance to insurgency had always operated (except perhaps in the excesses of the Cultural Revolution) as an integral and supportive element of Chinese foreign policy and it would be most surprising if larger policy concerns (Sino-American detente, entry into the United Nations and so forth) did not eventually affect the number of endorsements of revolutions. As of 1970 this process had not yet begun, but it remains to be seen in the next chapter if and how it would begin.

3) The entire history of Chinese foreign policy in the period reviewed in this chapter has witnessed Peking employing some type of two-pronged policy in regard to expanding its international influence. On the one level the PRC has made repeated attempts at diplomacy-from-above while on the other she has maintained her support of

people's wars. The United Front strategy had been maintained but the emphasis on the groups (governments or revolutionaries) with which to unite has definitely wavered. The question might well be asked as to which did, or will, take precedence. The answer is neither. Remembering the Chinese world view, Peking sees no inconsistency in courting both groups at the same time. Even in the face of expanded friendship with the West, considering the deeply rooted Maoist stress on revolution (both domestically and internationally), it seemed very unlikely that support of people's wars would be totally abandoned. Endorsement of revolutions was a very pragmatic policy tool that could be relied on when other techniques were unavailable or inadequate. Thus, the primary theme of this chapter is that China pursued a two-pronged strategy throughout the 1960s that should be analyzed in terms of emphasis of one prong or the other, rather than, in terms of exclusive pursuit of either one. It remains to be seen if the same holds true in the contemporary era.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD

> The fighting year of 1973 is over and the people of all nationalities in our country are joyously stepping into 1974 with an excellent situation prevailing at home and abroad. (Peking Review, Jan. 4, 1974: 1).

With these words, Jen-min Jih-pao began its 1974 New Year's Day editorial inferring that Peking's militant support of people's wars had been reduced or at least modified. This suggestion has been more directly expounded by a number of commentators on contemporary Chinese affairs, particularly Chalmers Johnson who argues that:

> It appears that China is haltingly abandoning its former commitment to subversion and revolution in the Third World, and accepting the need to work with the uncommitted noncommunist nations as they actually exist there (Johnson, 1973: 72).

If there is a trend toward a decline in China's support for wars of national liberation, or if indeed, assistance to people's wars has been eliminated as an element of Chinese foreign policy, then it would seem very probable that this change would be reflected in the Chinese press. What is the current Chinese view of people's wars and more importantly, what has been their record of endorsements in the past three and one-half years?

To answer these questions, this chapter will be presented in three sections. The first will present a quantitative analysis of China's endorsements of foreign revolutions as found in Peking Review (henceforth PR) in the period between January 1971 and July 1974. The second will briefly outline the general concerns and events that have characterized China's foreign policy in this same period. Section 3 will then provide the linkage between the first two sections by analysing the manner in which support of people's wars has meshed with these larger policy concerns.

SECTION I ENDORSEMENTS OF PEOPLE'S WARS FROM 1971 TO THE PRESENT: THE FINDINGS FROM PEKING REVIEW

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Peking Review

The choice of PR as the indicator of Chinese intentions needs some explanation. The magazine is a weekly news review published in Peking that is a collection of reports from assorted Chinese newspapers. It also includes special articles on the official Chinese position on international issues or world events in general. It is important to note that it is primarily directed at foreign readers as it is only published in English, German, Japanese, and Spanish. Being an official publication intended for a foreign audience, PR serves as a vehicle for the promotion of Chinese viewpoints and foreign policy. It is therefore a convenient and reliable indicator--a weathervane--of major developments in the area of foreign affairs.[1] Moreover, considering the findings of the first chapter, PR is particularly relevant to the study of people's wars for two main reasons. First, as it is almost exclusively designed for foreign readers it can be used to express the concerns of the Chinese leadership to both the populations and governments of other countries. It can be remembered from the last chapter that one of the principle functions of support of foreign revolutions was to communicate displeasure with other nations' actions. This being the case, it is a safe assumption that support of insurgencies would be a regular feature of the magazine: assistance is intentionally made very explicit and clear through this journal.

Second, even though Van Ness' analysis of endorsements was based on a number of Chinese periodicals in addition to PR,[2] his main sources were clearly PR and Jen-min Jih-pao. However, the comparability of my findings based solely on the use of PR is not compromised, since PR is a succinct digest of foreign news, with the great majority of key articles from Jen-min Jih-pao that deal directly with foreign policy (and particularly people's wars) being reprinted or synthesized in PR. Therefore, PR can be used as a very reliable indicator of Peking's rhetorical support for foreign insurgencies.

The Categories of Endorsement

Van Ness used two categories for endorsements; "implicit" in which the general category "People's" rather than specifically designated revolutionary groups were given encouragement, and "explicit" when Peking endorsed a particular rebel group. While the categorization scheme I used is essentially based on that of Van Ness' the following points should be noted,-

1) The categories of explicit and implicit endorsement are only used when there is reference leading to the clear conclusion that the struggle of a particular people has been both organized and armed. For instance, in "Firmly Support the Northern Irish People's Just Struggle" (PR, Feb. 25, 1972: 28) the struggle is never specified to be either organized or armed (i.e. no mention of the IRA) and despite the militant tone of the article--"the Northern Irish people are sure to overcome all obstacles and win new victory in their unremitting struggle"--it cannot be considered either an implicit or explicit endorsement.

2) In cases of people's wars that received a large number of endorsements (Vietnam, Cambodia and so forth) the presence of at least one explicit endorsement leads to the categorization of the revolution in the explicit category. It should also be noted that there were no endorsements made by Mao personally in the period examined. Therefore, all explicit endorsements originated from Party officials (particularily the U.N. delegation) or the Editorial staff of Jen-min Jih-pao.

3) Following Van Ness' lead, armed struggles in colonial areas have been categorized as explicit even if a particular revolutionary group was not specified. At a certain level this categorization is contrary to the specificity criterion that Van Ness notes (i.e. to be categorized as "implicit" a specific revolutionary group must have been recognized and endorsed), but to classify

the passionate and militant endorsement that Peking has extended to certain colonial areas as "implicit" would hide the very strong nature of the PRC's support for these struggles. The simple fact is that several of the colonial struggles such as the Namibian and Zambibwean are so limited and suppressed as not to possess an acknowledged leading group. Nevertheless, China's ideological perspective has necessitated the strongest form of support possible and I therefore have categorized this type of endorsement as "explicit".

4) Two points of clarification need be noted. First, although Van Ness presents a very clear listing of the revolutions endorsed in 1965, his subsequent exploration of the new targets of revolution in 1966 and 1967 gives no indication if Peking dropped support for any previously endorsed insurgency. Considering the militancy of the Cultural Revolution period and the fact that Van Ness gives no indication that any were no longer endorsed, I am proceeding on the assumption that the revolutions supported in 1966 included all those endorsed in 1965 plus the new ones added in that year. Similarly the revolutions supported in 1967 included all those endorsed in 1965 and 1966 plus any that were added in that latter year. Second, Van Ness does not note if the endorsements added in 1966 and 1967 are implicit or explicit. This unfortunate situation will be evidenced in a following table and it is therefore impossible to make a totally accurate longitudinal examination

of the balance between implicit and explicit endorsements.

5) Finally, for purposes of clarity, I have added a third category, "covert support." Two factors necessitated the inclusion of this new category. The first factor is that Chinese reports of intense struggle (for instance, "Politico-Economic Crisis and People's Struggle" (PR, July 7, 1972: 12-13) indicate an interest in class confrontation, although not specifically people's war, that is not recognized in either of the Van Ness categories. Second, the recent Vietnamese and Laotian peace settlements (as well as the earlier Korean one) preclude actual support of a people's war, for in theory the fighting has stopped and the PRC has agreed not to interfere. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Chinese wish the insurgents every success. The inclusion of this third category is intended to help measure Peking's revolutionary spirit in those instances that technically are not people's wars despite the fact that there is clear indication in PR that an armed struggle is occurring and is indeed favoured by the Chinese. This category captures information on the PRC's interest in revolutionary activity that would otherwise be omitted and although this evidence is only circumstantial, it is an indicator of China's current behaviour. While this category facilitates more accurate exploration of the Chinese position, it must be stressed that it was not used for purposes of comparing my results or totals with those of Van Ness.

THE FINDINGS

Two tables summarize Van Ness' findings as well as my own.

TABLE 1. Van Ness' Findings: Chinese Endorsements of Revolutions in the Years 1965, 1966 and 1967.

Year	Explicit Endorsement	Implicit Endorsements	Totals	
1965	South Vietnam	Dhofar (Congo)*	Explicit	13
	Laos	Argentina	Implicit	10
	Malaya	Brazil	Total	23
	North Borneo	Colombia		
	Thailand	Guatemala	Asia	7
	Aden	Haiti	Africa	4
	Congo	Honduras	Latin America	12
	Mozambique	Nicaragua		
	Guinea-Bissau	Paraguay	Colony	3
	Bolivia	Peru	Non Colony	20
	Dominican Republic			
	Venezuela			
	Angola			
1966	Endorsements**		Totals	
	ALL THOSE ABOVE PLUS			
	Bahrein		Endorsements	27
	Namibia (South West Africa)			
	Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)		Asia	8
	Spanish Guinea		Africa	7
			Latin America	12
			Colony	7
			Non Colony	20
1967	Endorsements**		Totals	
	ALL THOSE ABOVE PLUS			
	Burma		Endorsements	33
	India			
	Indonesia		Asia	12
	Palestine (Israel)		Africa	8
	Cameroon		Latin America	13
	Ecuador			
			Colony	7
			Non Colony	26

* Van Ness used the bracketed names, but in deference to the titles actually used in the Chinese press (Those employed by the revolutionary groups themselves) I have used local names.

** As noted on page 73, Van Ness gives no indication if the new endorsements were either implicit or explicit.

TABLE 2. My Findings: Chinese Endorsements of Revolutions in 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974*

Year	Explicit Endorsement	Implicit Endorsement	Totals	Covert Report
1971	South Vietnam Cambodia Laos Thailand Phillipines Mozambique Angola Guinea-Bissau Palestine** Namibia (Rhodesia)	Indonesia Malaya Spain	Explicit 10 Implicit 3 Total 13 Asia 7 Africa 5 Latin America 0 Europe 1 Colony 4 Non Colony 9	Taiwan South Korea Okinawa Panama United States
1972	South Vietnam Cambodia Laos Thailand Mozambique Angola Guinea-Bissau Palestine Dhofar (Oman) Zimbabwe	Phillipines Malaya North Kalimantan (Sarawak) Azania (South Africa) Brazil	Explicit 11 Implicit 5 Total 16 Asia 7 Africa 8 Latin America 1 Colony 7 Non Colony 9	Northern Ireland Uruguay Panama
1973	South Vietnam Cambodia Laos Mozambique Angola Guinea-Bissau Palestine Zimbabwe Namibia Azania	Spanish South Sahara Thailand Honduras Brazil	Explicit 10 Implicit 4 Total 14 Asia 4 Africa 8 Latin America 2 Colony 7 Non Colony 7	Panama
1974 (Up to July 1)	Cambodia Angola Mozambique Guinea-Bissau Zimbabwe Namibia	Malaya Phillipines North Kalimantan Azania	Explicit 6 Implicit 4 Total 10 Asia 4 Africa 6 Latin America 0 Colony 6 Non Colony 4	Chile Panama Puerto Rica South Vietnam

*As noted, "1974" only includes January to July.

**Palestine will be counted as part of Africa even though the Chinese have placed it at different times in Asia as well. See, Johnson, 1973: 69-70.

The above two tables present a very clear picture of the people's wars that the PRC has provided with at least rhetorical support. My research has revealed four major findings as to the pattern of endorsements over the latter half of the 1960s as well as in the contemporary era.

1) Support of people's wars is still a very real element of Chinese external relations. Even though the nature of the support, and the movements supported, has undergone a number of changes (discussed below), this study clearly demonstrates that people's war is far from dead. 1973 saw Peking endorse fourteen revolutionary movements (10 explicitly) and even in the first half 1974, ten have been endorsed.[3]

CHART 1. Number of Endorsed Revolutions in the Years 1965-1967 and 1971-1974



Reflecting the revolutionary zeal of the Cultural Revolution, endorsement of foreign revolutions reached its peak in 1967. Because the years 1968, 1969 and 1970 have not been investigated it is somewhat unclear as to exactly how and when the number of endorsed revolutions dropped, but it is evident that by 1971 the total had dropped to less than one half of the peak. However, since this drop occurred, the past four years have witnessed a more or less uniform level of endorsement. Contradicting the thesis that support of people's wars was being "haltingly abandoned" (Johnson, 1973: 72) it is found that three countries (Malaya, Phillipines and North Kalimantan) were endorsed in 1974 even though they had not been in 1973. With these three exceptions the actual countries or colonies selected as targets of revolution have also been consistent; of the fourteen targets selected in 1973, eleven had been endorsed in the two previous years. If one includes the "Covert Support" category, the four year period shows a parallel pattern. It is therefore the case that after a major reduction of endorsements between 1967 and 1971, the number of endorsements has remained relatively stable over the past three and one-half years. However, this numerical pattern belies several shifts and rearrangements from the period Van Ness studied and the remainder of this section will present three of the major underlying changes.

2) A comparison of the contemporary era and the middle 1960s indicates a marked geographic shift in the

countries or colonies endorsed. A simple table of continental location reveals this quite clearly.

TABLE 3. Endorsements by Continent

Year	Asia	Non-Asia			Totals
		Africa	Latin America	Other	
1965	7 (31%)	4 (17%)	12 (52%)	0 (0%)	23 (100%)
1966	8 (29%)	7 (26%)	12 (45%)	0 (0%)	27 (100%)
1967	12 (36%)	8 (24%)	13 (40%)	0 (0%)	33 (100%)
1971	7 (54%)	5 (38%)	0 (0%)	1 (8%)	13 (100%)
1972	7 (44%)	8 (50%)	3 (21%)	0 (0%)	16 (100%)
1973	4 (29%)	7 (50%)	3 (21%)	0 (0%)	14 (100%)
1974	4 (40%)	6 (60%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	10 (100%)

It is apparent that since the period of the Cultural Revolution, support of insurgencies in Latin America has almost disappeared.[5] Endorsement of Asian revolutions has remained more or less consistent as a percentage of the total endorsed in any given year. The people's wars in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were given repeated and vocal support, but it should be noted that Thailand was only implicitly endorsed in 1973 and has not been mentioned at all in 1974. The percentage slack created by the shift away from Latin America has been taken up by the endorsement of African movements, which, in absolute terms, has remained more or less uniform at approximately 6.5 per year throughout the decade. Only one non-Third World country was targeted and this was Spain in 1971. The Basque uprising only received one implicit endorsement in that year thereby revealing that Peking's support of people's wars is for all intents and purposes still exclusively concerned with Third World insurgencies.

3) It should also be noted that a definite modification in support patterns regarding colonial-independent status reveals itself.

TABLE 4. Endorsements by National (Colonial or Independent) Status.

Year	Endorsement of People's Wars in Colonies	Endorsement of People's Wars in Indep. Countries	Totals
1965	3 (13%)	20 (87%)	23*
1966	7 (26%)	20 (74%)	27
1967	7 (21%)	26 (79%)	33
1971	4 (30%)	9 (70%)	13
1972	7 (43%)	9 (57%)	16
1973	7 (50%)	7 (50%)	14
1974	6 (60%)	4 (40%)	10

*All percents in the "Total" column equal 100%.

The percentages indicate that support of insurgencies in colonial areas has risen from relative insignificance (13%) to at least one half of the total endorsements in 1973. The number of endorsements has remained approximately consistent, but the endorsements in independent countries has dropped substantially from 26 in 1967 to 7 in 1973. It should be noted that all of the colonial struggles endorsed are taking place in Africa. This comes of little surprise as it is simply the case that Africa is the last bastion of colonial rule where indigenous populations are seeking their independence.

Whereas Van Ness' findings show a very heavy emphasis on revolution in independent countries, my research reveals that endorsements in these nations have significantly been reduced while support of wars of national liberation in colonial areas has remained relatively consistent. The identification of this trend is bolstered by the fact that Peking is increasingly using the term "national liberation struggle" rather than the traditionally used "people's war".

4) Finally, it should be noted that the rhetoric describing foreign revolutions has changed in recent years. No longer is continual mention made of the involvement of "American imperialism" or any of its various synonyms.[6] Whereas in the 1960s and even in 1971 and 1972 almost every endorsement was coupled with an attack on the United States (for instance, "Cambodian People's War Against U.S. Aggression and for National Salvation Will Win" (PR, March 31, 1972), late 1972 and thereafter has witnessed reference to the anti-American struggle only in regards to some of the insurgencies in Latin America, which indeed were very few. The movements in other areas are saluted as anti-colonial or anti-the-particular-government, but mention of the U.S. is very rare.

In conclusion, four main findings can be identified.

1) Support of people's wars is far from dead, but it can be noted that the number of endorsed revolutions is well below the peak years of 1966 and 1967.

2) There has been a marked geographic shift in the locations of endorsed insurgencies. Where previously Latin America represented the locus of the Chinese efforts, it has been diminished to comparative insignificance and replaced by African colonial areas. Support of Asian insurgencies has also been reduced in absolute terms, but has remained a relatively consistent percentage of the total endorsements.

3) Struggles in colonial areas now comprise at least one half of the endorsements while the number of supported revolutions in independent countries has been steadily falling.

4) References to the United States in connection with people's wars has almost disappeared.

These findings can only be explained in terms of the larger concerns of Chinese foreign policy and it will be the task of the following section to outline the composition of this foreign policy in the past three and a half years.

SECTION II. MAJOR TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

In a joint editorial of People's Daily, Red Flag and Army Daily on October 1, 1972,[1] Peking made several new directions in her foreign policy very clear. T.C. Rhee (1974: 66-67) has conducted an excellent analysis of the editorial and he concludes that contemporary Chinese foreign policy is based on seven major beliefs:

1) The Soviet Union is China's most hostile enemy;

2) The detente between the Soviet Union and the United States is superficial;

3) in opposing the two superpowers, China relies not only on the developing nations but also on certain capitalist states;

4) in carrying out such a policy China will take a flexible posture;

5) a policy of peaceful coexistence is not contradictory to world revolution;

6) people's revolution in the Third World must first of all depend on their own efforts;

7) the policy of the anti-Chinese containment and isolation has failed. These seven beliefs are the product of two series of events which have undoubtedly shaped contemporary Chinese external relations; first, the PRC's new acceptance in the world community, and second, new developments in the global balance of power as represented by the Soviet-American-Chinese triangle. It will be the task of this section to assess the nature of each of these two events and to more closely investigate what impact they had on China's external policy.

CHINA'S NEW ACCEPTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The problem was noted earlier that China's alternatives and strategies were severely restricted by reason of her non-acceptance into the mainstream of international affairs. The past three years have seen significant changes in this regard, and three main events can be isolated; China's admission to the United Nations, proliferation in the number of official diplomatic ties with other nations, and a new (if self-fashioned) Third World leadership position for the PRC.

Admission to the United Nations

The admission of the People's Republic of China to the U.N. on October 25, 1971 represented the successful culmination of numerous Chinese diplomatic attempts to secure entrance as well as the beginning of a new chapter in China's international affairs. The American inspired diplomatic isolation of China had come to an end and the PRC was finally provided with the "institutional framework in which she could participate as one of the major actors in the newly emerging international system" (Kim, 1974: 330). As Kim's analysis of PR reveals, the Chinese appear to be taking their new role very seriously as demonstrated by the fact that the number of articles referring to the U.N.'s activities has risen from 1 in 1970 to 88 in 1972.[2] Moreover, the Chinese have proven adept at using the mechanisms of the "institution of world peace" to further advance their acceptance into the established diplomatic community as evidenced by the negotiations that led to the normalization of relations with Mexico and Cyprus in early 1972. The final point of importance is that contrary to the numerous predictions of cataclysmic consequences resulting from rabid Chinese disruption of the workings of the U.N. system, the PRC's ideological predilections "do not seem to be a decisive determinant of Chinese diplomacy in the United Nations"(Kim, 1974: 328). Peking has consistently minimized any disruptive impact by refusing to press a number of controversial issues (the Vietnam question, the presence of American troops in Taiwan, multilateral aid), and by a "serious and cautious" use of the veto have not impeded the efficient operation of the Security Council.[4] In short, China's admission to the U.N. has dramatically expanded the PRC's potential for increased international acceptance without seriously disrupting the international system. Kim makes it very lucid that "the PRC is playing the diplomatic game in the institution of world peace by the established rules, rather than attempting to replace or repudiate them", and further that "the camel's nose of an embourgeoisement process has already entered the tent of China's U.N. diplomacy" (1974: 329).

When analyzed, Chinese behaviour at the U.N. can be seen to be a result of the PRC's new "pragmatic" outlook in an institutional setting.[3] Subsequent discussion will pursue how far this pragmatism has actually modified Peking's goals and strategies regarding larger foreign policy concerns, but for the present it should be noted that the PRC's involvement with the U.N. demonstrates an evident desire to seek and expand its international prestige in more or less conventional ways.

Diplomatic Recognition

Related to U.N. membership has been the fulfillment of Peking's long term goal of the establishment of diplomatic relations with existing governments. As mentioned above, her new seat at the U.N. has greatly facilitated the achievement of this goal. Combined with a determined effort in people-to-people diplomacy ("ping-pong diplomacy" for instance) that began in late 1970, the PRC succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with 90 countries by October 1973. This new-found recognition has undoubtedly had favourable effect on Chinese self-esteem, but has also furthered the cause of an independent foreign policy that isolation made impossible.

Third World Leadership Position

In addition to recognition, the PRC seems to have assumed the role of leading spokesman and defender of the interests of the Third World governments. In the last three and a half years Peking has increasingly discussed its common cause with other Third World countries. In articles such as "Third World Role in International Affairs" (PR January 5, 1973), "Third World Countries Play Increasingly

Important Role in International Affairs" (PR October 27, 1972) and "Third World Awakening and Growing Strong in United Struggle" (PR March 22, 1974), Peking has supported the common struggle of the developing nations in opposing American imperialism and Soviet "social imperialism" (socialism in word, imperialism in deed). The following quotation from "Resolute Support for the Third World's Just Demands" (PR April 12, 1974: 9) reveals an emphasis that had not been seen since the Bandung era twenty years prior.

> China is a developing socialist country belonging to the Third World. We always stand together with the Third World countries and fight shoulder to shoulder with them. Their every victory is a tremendous support and inspiration to us.

Chinese foreign policy continues to be based on the united front, but in contradistinction to the united front-from-below that characterized her foreign policy in the middle 1960's, the contemporary period is based on a united front-from-above that stresses government-to-government relations. By supporting the economic, nationalist, racial and anti-colonial issues that are so critical to developing areas, and by actively denouncing big power chauvinism, the PRC has augmented her self-image and identity as a leader; the champion of the Third World's just cause.[5]

The external trappings of this leadership role have been manifested in the so called "banquet diplomacy" that has witnessed scores of world heads of states visiting the People's Republic of China. The extensive coverage given these visits indicates that they are important to China in both an international and domestic sense; internationally they proclaim China's entrance into a world system that has long considered it weak and worthy of only the slightest concern. At the domestic level, the PRC's advances serve as reminder of the validity of the new China and its continued progress. Whereas in the 1960's visiting revolutionaries played this role, visits from heads of states in the 1970's reinforce China's claims to importance.

Exactly how effective these policies have been in solidifying Third World interests is difficult to ascertain, "but it would be a mistake to assume that Peking has yet made a major impact in these areas, or that the Third-World nations have embraced the PRC as their leader" (Kim, 1974: 315). This is not to contradict the fact that Peking is making determined efforts in this direction, but rather it suggests that "most Third-World nations seems to act as sophisticated spectators" (315); they are not instant believers despite Peking's rhetoric.

Membership in the U.N., extended diplomatic interaction and the establishment (at least rhetorically) of a Third World camp with China at its head, have all combined to increase China's alternatives and therefore provide her with some of the mechanisms that major powers have conventionally used to pursue their particular interests. Indeed, state-to-state relations are playing an increasingly important role in China's overall foreign policy if for no other reason that the institutional channels for its operation are now available to her.

SOVIET-AMERICAN-CHINESE TRIANGLE

Contemporary Chinese foreign policy must also be analyzed in light of the realities of power politics and the global balance of power. It is clear that Chinese development, both internally and internationally, has raised the PRC to a level of importance such that international affairs on a world scale cannot be understood without reference to it. Indeed, as Harry Schwartz (1974: 45) notes:

> For most purposes...there are three players. One can no longer speak about Soviet-American relations without isolating the factor of the Soviet-American-Chinese triangle. Certainly, Washington, Moscow and Peking no longer make that kind of mistake.

Mindful of Peking's new role, there appear to be two intimately related major strands in China's relationship with the superpowers; increasing friendship (entente) with the United States, and increased hostility with the Soviet Union.

Following the Nixon-Kissinger visits to Peking it was apparent that Sino-American relations were at a new high. Actual products of this new relationship included a number of material ties; cultural-scientific exchanges, various trade pacts, flow-of-information agreements and significant expansion of the role of the liaison offices to include functions normally conducted at the ambassadorial level. It also introduced an element of general good will that found evident expression in the press of each country. However, considering the plethora of ideological, territorial and strategic differences that had previously plagued relations between the two giants, what made this new relationship possible?

The first element of common interest is a mutual desire for the maintenance of their particular spheres of influence in the face of mounting Soviet pressure.

> Primarily, it must be assumed that Peking and Washington are keenly aware of the precarious and uncertain fluctuations in the world balance of power and have decided to coordinate their efforts to ensure reasonable equilibrium and stability on regional and global levels (Rhee, 1974: 153-154).

Moreover, in the region of their most immediate joint interest, Asia, both appear to recognize that any effort to insure regional stability and negate the influences of other powers (The Soviet Union and Japan in particular) depends on an important degree of cooperation. This process began and has been reinforced with the "resolution" of the Vietnam conflict.

Despite the importance of these common strategic interests, the Chinese willingness to cooperate has largely sprung from the Sino-Soviet conflict. In an earlier section the hostile state of relations between the PRC and USSR was outlined, and it should be noted that, since that time, relations have deteriorated even further as witnessed by the Chinese identification of the Soviet Union as their "most vicious enemy".[6] A potential military conflict is an ever increasing possibility. For their part the Soviets have proceeded with continued military buildups along the Chinese borders. As Schwartz (1974: 45) notes, "an apocalyptic vision of a possible future Sino-Chinese war is in the mind of, literally, the great majority of the 250 million Soviet citizens alive today", and combined with real fears of a Sino-American alliance, this has resulted in increased Soviet militancy. On the political level the Soviets have pursued a number of policies aimed at erosion of the Chinese position. These include consolidation of ties with India, extended support of North Vietnam's hard-line policies (an attempt to precipitate a clash between the U.S. and China), recognition of Prince Sihanouk as Cambodian head of state, and tentative contacts with South Korea.

The PRC has also made clear, if restricted, military gestures by increasing her efforts to forge a limited nuclear capability, both offensive and defensive, comprised of "major launching sites, large scale underground shelters, an anti-missile early warning system, and data processing equipment" (Rhee, 1974: 155). By way of political counter-attack, they have made determined efforts to extend their influence in the Third World (particularly the Arab states), to increase the flexibility and amicability of their relationship with West Germany and Japan, as well as to unleash an unprecedented verbal denouncement of the "revisionist-fascist-dictatorship" (PR January 25, 1974). Her most important response has been to seek improved relations with the United States, both to minimize the possibility of Soviet-American collusion as well as to provide some leverage against growing Soviet belligerency. Considering Soviet attempts to do exactly the same, it is ironic that the two communist giants are caught up in a competitive battle to woo the leading "imperialist power".

It can be seen that the Soviet threat (both military and political) is the most critical international problem facing the PRC. The commonality of goals and interests shared by the U.S. and China can therefore be seen as only a contributing factor to the easing of tensions. The amicable relationship between the PRC and the U.S. is based on an evident Chinese belief "that a war between China and the USSR would constitute an unmitigated catastrophe" and that with this in mind, "neither the Chinese nor the Americans have allowed their deep ideological and institutional differences to detract from their central objective" (Rhee, 1974: 178).

In summary, Chinese foreign policy in the past three and a half years has been characterized by four main points:

1) An increased acceptance into the diplomatic community that has allowed the PRC to pursue more conventional methods of influence.

2) A pronounced attempt to fashion for itself a role as leader of the Third World governments.

3) An expanding "detente" with the United States.

4) Growing fear and resentment of the USSR.

It rests with the final section of this chapter to investigate how contemporary Chinese support of people's wars (the revolutionary prong of Chinese foreign policy), has been reconciled with these global considerations.

SECTION III. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY AND PEOPLE'S WAR IN THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD

The purpose of this final section is to provide a broader explanation and discussion of the empirical findings outlined in section one of this chapter. This explanation of the present day patterns of China's support for people's wars will be based on the major issues in contemporary Chinese foreign policy previously noted, but will also involve several aspects of the Chinese world view that was investigated in the first chapter. It is helpful to begin this discussion with a simple table of the findings to this point.

Table 5. Findings on the Contemporary Period

Findings on People's War Support	Major Trends in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy
1) Geographic Shift	1) Increased Acceptance into the International Community
2) Emphasis on Colonial Struggles	2) New (if self-fashioned) Third World Leadership Role
3) Minimal Reference to U.S. Duplicity	3) Increasing friendship with the U.S.
4) People's War not Dead, But Definitely Diminished From the Peak Years	4) Escalating Hostility With the USSR

1) Continental Shift. It should be remembered that the continental shift in the areas endorsed involved a dramatic reduction in emphasis on Latin America, a lesser diminution in Asia and more or less consistent support of the National Liberation Movements (hereafter, NLM's) in Africa. The general trend towards abatement of the number of endorsed people's wars (as particularly reflected in Asia) will be discussed in detail at a later point in this section, but two findings related to this trend require immediate explanation: first, the very low level of support to Latin American insurgencies; and second, the consistent level of support for African revolutionary movements.

In addition to the general trend toward reduction of endorsements, the fact that Latin America is a critical element of American strategic concerns has undoubtedly had the effect of minimizing Chinese efforts in the area. In recognition of the sensitive nature of American feelings towards hemispheric stability, it appears very likely that a Chinese reduction of revolutionary support was a definite concession to the United States. As noted, this activity has not been totally curtailed (in 1973, 3 were endorsed), but it is very clear that continental emphasis has shifted away from the Americas.

The fact that Africa is comparatively less important to the U.S. than is Latin America, and considering that support of African NLM's does not therefore seriously jeopardize the increasingly friendly Sino-American relationship, contributes part of the explanation for China's continued support of the continent's revolutionary movements. However, a much more important reason for Chinese emphasis on Africa is that the struggles on that continent are all distinctly anti-colonial. Colonialism is a relatively "safe" target. Both the superpowers are officially opposed to it. Third World countries are militant in their opposition to it as witnessed by the OAU heads of states calling for, and monetarily supporting, the overthrow of colonial regimes in Africa. In cases of overt colonialism the Chinese can support insurgency and thereby gain political advantage with the existing black governments while reinforcing the domestic revolutionary values that were discussed in chapter 1. It can be remembered that there is a strong ideological imperative to support anti-colonial struggles. In this case ideology does not preclude the furtherance of state-to-state relations and in fact promotes them by allowing a "united front against all colonialism" to be forged. The fact that Africa possesses the last clear-cut and determined colonial struggles explains why the Chinese pay such special attention to it.

2) Emphasis on Colonies. The discussion of the continental shift outlined the primary motive for the emphasis on colonies rather than independent countries. However, two further points can be noted. First, support of anti-colonial struggles is necessary for the PRC to maintain its "ideological credentials" in the dispute with the USSR.

In a limited sense this is the case in the support of any oppressed peoples, but as earlier noted, in overtly anti-colonial struggles, the Chinese have little choice but to offer support if they wish to maintain their credibility in the battle with revisionism. Second, it needs to be made explicit that the Chinese attack on colonialism is favourably received by the majority of nation states and is therefore a tool of further acceptance into the international community that necessitates no compromises in revolutionary fervour.

3) Minimal Reference to U.S. Duplicity. The diminishing mention of "U.S. imperialism" in connection with people's wars is inversely proportionate to growing Sino-American friendship. It is clear that more positive relations between the two countries would have been greatly impeded if the high level of anti-American propaganda had been continued. American "imperialism" and "big power hegemonism" are still occasionally attacked, but the frequency and intensity of these attacks has been greatly reduced in the past three years. At the ideological level, detachment of American complicity in counter-insurgencies (previously in every case) allows the Chinese to proffer support to rebels without it appearing to be an attack on the Americans and thereby damaging relations. Moreover, the U.S. is simply no longer the main enemy, and rhetorical statements reflect this new situation. The best insults are reserved for the worst enemy which is now the Soviet Union.

4) People's War not Dead, But Definitely Diminished From Its Peak Years. Of course, this final finding is the most important and inclusive of the four. In reality, it represents two findings: first, the number of endorsed revolutions in the contemporary period is considerably lower than in the middle 1960's; and second, support of people's wars continues as an element of Chinese foreign policy. These two findings seem built on somewhat contradictory principles; one suggests continued support and the other indicates eventual disappearance of the revolutionary prong of China's international behaviour. It is critical that both of these tendencies be carefully examined to better understand the contemporary relationship of people's war support to Chinese foreign policy, as well as to lay groundwork for the prediction of future developments.

A brief look at the four major trends in China's foreign policy gives evidence of a number of concerns that would seem to act against continued endorsement of people's wars. Except in the case of clearly anti-colonial struggles, it is apparent that attempts to support world revolution run counter to achieving increased international acceptance. There already exist any number of Cassandras ready to ring alarms over the "Communist Chinese"[1] export of revolution. At a general level, diplomacy-from-above (state-to-state relations) is immensely difficult to conduct if the Chinese seem intent on subverting existing regimes and generally reordering the world system. More specifically, individual states are very unlikely to listen to or follow a nation that is actively supporting their overthrow. In this sense, China's old leadership role (leader of the world's revolutionaries) is incompatible with her desired new one and numerous scholars have argued that she will abandon the former in favour of increased international acceptance. Their argument is that particularly in the era of Sino-Soviet controversy, the PRC cannot risk the critical support of Third World governments by adventurist attempts at inciting revolution.

Overall, it appears that the PRC's new emphasis on state-to-state relations (the first prong of the two pronged system), improved relations with the United States, and extended involvement with Third World governments, all tend towards reducing China's interest in and support for people's wars. As demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, these concerns have evidently been recognized by Chinese policy makers for the actual number of insurgencies endorsed has been substantially reduced. Further, asides from the endorsements in colonies and China's immediate neighbours, the number of "targets for revolution" has been negligible in comparison to the total of possible Third World insurgencies.[2]

However, it is clearly the case that support of people's wars has not disappeared and even in situations other than colonial struggles, it is evident that it still is an important element of Chinese foreign policy. There might be a host of logical reasons (at least to the Western mind) why Peking's revolutionary stance should be eliminated, but the Chinese obviously see things in a different light. Indeed, as Arthur Huck notes:

> We assume that China must fit into one of our categories and must see her security [interests] in terms of one of our systems. It is not at all clear that she does (Huck, 1972: 142).

Therefore, the question must be investigated as to what functions endorsement of foreign revolutions plays in China's contemporary external affairs? This question can best be approached by referring back to the functions it assumed in the earlier period, and expanding or modifying them as the contemporary situation dictates. These functions can be broken into two main categories: first, strategic-political considerations at the global level; and second, consistency with political-ideological values in the PRC itself.

Strategic-Political Considerations

With the reduction of the American presence in Asia, the necessity of maintaining pressure on "American imperialism" became considerably less acute. This is not to suggest that the Chinese have abandoned all attempts to fight imperialism, but rather it indicates that the need for a counter threat to direct American military pressure is no longer immediate. Moreover, people's war is of little advantage to the PRC in opposing the Soviets at the military level. Short of sending supplies to Czechoslovakia, support of insurgencies will have little military effect on the Soviets. Therefore, as a technique for drawing military pressure away from the PRC, support of people's war has become rather useless.

However, it still is of considerable importance in opposing the Russians on the ideological plain. By supporting revolutionary movements the Chinese can strengthen their claims to theoretical purity that they argue the Soviet "revisionists" long ago lost. The exact importance of this ideological battle is somewhat unclear, but the Chinese press repeatedly uses it as one of their few weapons in attacking the USSR.

Continued Chinese support of people's wars also maintains a "beachhead" in Third World revolutionary groups, that can still be used to communicate Chinese feelings and exert pressure on errant governments. Clearly this function is less important than in the past when the PRC had no access to the institutional channels that have traditionally been used to express these considerations, but it still can operate as at least a back-up system. In essence, continued support of a minimum number of insurgencies keeps open Chinese alternatives by maintaining the credibility of China's revolutionary intentions. Of course, this is of immediate importance to rebel groups, but it also is important to Third World governments who must realize that state-to-state relations have not totally precluded diplomacy-from-below or the "Spirit of Yenan". If for some reason Chinese inroads into the international community collapse, continued (if minimal) support of the"people's struggles" keeps open the less satisfactory, but totally workable "united front-from-below". Therefore, the maintenance of the revolutionary prong of Chinese foreign policy has considerable value if only as an alternative in the event of the other prong failing.

Consistency With Domestic Political Values

To this point the discussion has been exclusively concerned with the input of international forces into the formation of Chinese foreign policy. However, it is obvious that there are a number of domestic inputs that are of equal, if not greater importance. In the contemporary period these domestic values are still closely aligned with the "Spirit of Yenan". In even the most recent issues of PR there is repeated mention of revolutionary values and class struggle (anti-Confucius, anti-Lin campaign[3]). "The fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat are [still] equally inevitable" (PR, July 26, 1974: 23). More specifically, there still exists an active left wing of the CCP that despite comparative weakness, is a potent force in revealing and criticizing revisionist forces.

At a larger level, the Thought of Mao Tse-tung dictates a certain world view that supports revolutionary values at both the domestic and international level. Contemporary rhetoric has changed the principal contradiction from U.S. imperialism to Soviet social-imperialism, but the fact remains that the central contradiction in the world is between oppressed and oppressor. "Maoist morality" still has a critical influence on China's international posture, and to date there is little evidence that the PRC is losing any of its revolutionary fervour.

In this connection it is most instructive to refer to Teng Hsiao-ping's General Assembly Speech of April 1974 as indicative of the most recent developments in Chinese foreign policy.[4] A series of quotes from the speech reveals no apparent reduction in China's rhetorical support of revolutionary movements nor any major changes in the Maoist world view.

> The whole world is in turbulence and unrest. The situation is one of 'great disorder under heaven' as we Chinese put it. This 'disorder' is a manifestation of the sharpening of all the basic contradictions in the contemporary world. It is accelarating the disintegration and decline of the decadent reactionary forces and stimulating the awakening and growth of the new emerging forces of the people (6).

> "Revolution is the main trend in the world today" (7).

In discussing China's relationship with the Third World, Teng notes Peking's new image as a developing nation intent on leading the common struggle, but also introduces the Maoist concern for the "people"

> China is a socialist country and a developing country as well. China belongs to the Third World. Consistently following Chairman Mao's teachings, the Chinese Government and people firmly support all oppressed peoples and oppressed nations in their struggle to win or defend national independence, develop the national economy and oppose colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism (11).

Most importantly he reaffirms the close relationship between Chinese domestic policies and its international behaviour.

> The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which has been carried out in China in recent years, and the campaign criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius now underway throughout China, are both aimed at preventing capitalist restoration and ensuring that socialist China will never change her colour and will always stand by the oppressed peoples and nations (11).

What is apparent is a consistent re-emphasis of many of the same concerns (imperialism, oppression, struggle) that have long characterized the Maoist world view. This world view has become part of China's own identity, and support of the oppressed through revolutionary assistance is part of it. "As a major element of China's self image, the doctrine of people's war support is of vital psychological as well as ideological importance to the PRC" (Lovelace, 1972: 100). Overall, China's visible support of Third World revolutionary struggle provides a clear continuity between the world situation (particularly Chinese foreign policy) and the domestic political values the CCP wishes to instill. It also has the effect of raising world revolutionary consciousness by planting the Maoist model throughout the world and thereby hastening the fall of imperialism.

In summary, it can be seen that support of people's wars still assumes a number of important functions. First, it still is an important ideological weapon that can be used against the Soviets. Second, it maintains China's "revolutionary credibility" that allows the Chinese to keep operational diplomacy-from-below. At the present moment this revolutionary emphasis is overshadowed by state-to-state relations, but the important point is that the Chinese are maintaining it as a back-up system. Third, and most importantly, it provides the PRC with a consistency in its world view. Moreover, it furthers the transmission of Maoist ideology both at home and abroad.

People's war is not dead but it has been modified. The nature of the struggles supported has undergone both a continental shift and currently places emphasis on anti-colonial insurgencies. The condition of the present international system has made both these changes necessary but it is clear that internal Chinese values are still sufficiently strong to have a substantial impact on Chinese international behaviour. There seems to be no let up in China's revolutionary commitment even though it is manifested in slightly different forms designed to be more acceptable to the world community and the Third World in particular.

To conclude this chapter, another quote from Teng's speech indicates the contemporary spirit in Chinese foreign policy that is the back-drop for Peking's support of people's wars. His emphasis on revolutionary values as well as the achievements of Third World governments succinctly captures the essence of China's endorsements of revolution in the past three and a half years.

> History advances in struggle and the world advances amidst turbulence. The imperialists, and the superpowers in particular, are beset with troubles and are on the decline. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--that is the inevitable

> trend of history. We are convinced that, so long as the Third World countries and people strengthen their unity, ally themselves with all forces that can be allied with and persist in protracted struggle, they are sure to win continuous new victories. (PR, April 19, 1974: 11).

CONCLUSION

It has been apparent throughout the ten years studied in this paper that China's foreign policy has been carried on at two levels: the state-to-state level at which governments conduct their affairs, and diplomacy-from-below that involves a more revolutionary--"agitation from the roots"--stance. Rather than either one or the other operating as the sole basis of China's external relations at a given time, both exist simultaneously. The question is one of emphasis. Indeed, it simply is not a situation of "either-or", and any analysis that fails to recognize this point misses the sophistication of the PRC's foreign policy in the last decade.

With this in mind, it can be seen that there exist two major inputs into Chinese foreign policy that substantially determine which level will actually be given emphasis. On the one hand there exists the realities of the external international environment. The global balance of power, the position of Third World countries, the level of polarization and so forth, all have the effect of limiting the PRC's alternatives (as they do any states) and prescribe possible courses of action. The second input is the Chinese world view and Maoist ideology that define both Peking's vision of reality and the goals shec seeks to attain. The second input prescribes what is "good" and the first circumscribes what is possible. The changing emphasis between revolutionary and more conventional strategies is a product of the interaction of the two.

In the years 1965 and 1966 it was clear that the PRC's outcast position in the international community precluded any successful emphasis on state-to-state relations. Therefore, any leverage it could exert had to come from the other level at its disposal and articles such as "Long Live the Victory of People's War" gave voice to the Chinese analysis of the world situation and their strategy for dealing with it. The period of the Cultural Revolution witnessed a dramatic revolutionary zeal within the PRC itself that was manifested in a further emphasis on Third World revolution. The demonstrations of assorted groups of Chinese students revealed that the rest of the world (i.e. the international system) was definitely not receptive or amenable to such a radical position. Consequently, China's international prestige and acceptance reached an all-time low.

Certain changes in both domestic Chinese politics and the international balance of power modified this position in the last years of the 1960's. Inside the PRC moderate elements succeeded in stabilizing domestic politics and re-establishing a more moderate line in the MFA. Ministry of Foreign Affairs internationally, mounting Soviet pressure, and increasing Third World support dictated that the Chinese alter their revolutionary stance in favour of more extended relations at the governmental level. The result was a period of transition. The Chinese press still lashed out at "imperialists and their running dogs" but there also were very real attempts to expand Peking's institutional relationship (entrance to the U.N. for instance) with the existing international community.

It is clear that by the contemporary period (post 1970) China possessed the international prestige and acceptance necessary to puruse more normalized relations with the rest of the world. Correspondingly, her support of people's wars and the revolutionary line were less important to her security and bargaining power than in the past, and the level of endorsement fell dramatically. Nevertheless, China's commitment to the destruction of imperialism and the creation of a new world order without superpowers remained an important, if often overlooked, element of the rhetoric and, as this paper has demonstrated, policy of the PRC.

Therefore, in assessing probable trends in China's future behaviour it is necessary to examine them in light of the two inputs (domestic and external) as well as the two levels of foreign policy (state-to-state and people-to-people).

Regarding the future support of people's war, several facts are clear.

1) There is little foreseeable likelihood that the four major trends vis a vis China in the contemporary international system will change radically in the next three to five years. China's increased acceptance into the international community, her new leadership role in the Third World, her increasing friendship with the United States and expanding (if not constant) hostilities with the USSR are likely to be the major cornerstones of the PRC's international environment for the foreseeable future.

2) The Maoist world view is not going to change either. Teng Hsiao-ping's U.N. speech revealed very many of the same concerns that the PRC has been voicing for the past twenty-five years, and as long as domestic political values put such stress on revolutionary thought...the Spirit of Yenan...China's international behaviour will reflect an important degree of this spirit.

With these two main points in mind, people's war will continue as an element of Chinese foreign policy in the years to come. The real question is what form will this support assume. In the contemporary period, there seems to exist some degree of compromise between the two levels of diplomacy. Although the PRC continues to support a number of insurgencies in independent countries, the increasing majority of its assistance is being devoted to anti-colonial struggles. In this way the PRC can maintain its revolutionary elan (and credibility) without seriously hurting its attempts to further its international acceptance.

The future will likely see a continuation of this trend towards anti-colonial support, but there is little question that the Chinese are maintaining the ideological basis for a renewed "assault" on independent countries should the need ever arise.

Two future events will measure the validity of my predictions. First, if and when fighting again breaks out in South Vietnam, the Chinese will be placed in a highly difficult position that will be most revealing. On the one hand, if they support the insurgents they will run a very grave risk of aggravating the United States and thereby weakening their own position *vis a vis* the Soviet Union. On the other hand, failure to support their "proletarian comrades" would undoubtedly deal a severe blow to any continued revolutionary ideology.

The second event will probably occur more immediately and it concerns the Chinese response to the liberation of the African colonies that are the present focus of China's revolutionary support. Recent events in Portugal have made it very evident that Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau will soon be given their independence. Of course, South Africa and Rhodesia will still remain as colonial bastions, but the disappearance of colonial targets will tip the hand of the Chinese policy makers. If no new targets of revolution are designated, the number of endorsed revolutions will approach insignificance and this indeed will indicate a dramatic change in China's two-level policy. If new revolutions are endorsed they will have to be supported in "independent" countries and considering Chinese attempts to work with rather than against Third World governments, this too will have dramatic ramifications.

In short, people's war is still an active element of Chinese foreign policy. Despite the "normalization" of China's relations with the existing international system, domestic ideology and the Maoist world view prescribes an international behaviour that contains elements of both diplomacy-from-above and diplomacy-from-below. There does exist the possibility that a change in the leadership of the PRC might indeed alter this world view. However, considering the present condition of education, politics and power alignments within the PRC itself, it is almost impossible that any successor to Mao could, or would want to, renounce the Maoist emphasis on revolutionary values. China's present support of people's struggles is a very real part of her revolutionary history and subsequent world view, and there is little chance that it will disappear in the foreseeable future.

ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. The nine were: Allen S. Whiting, G.F. Hudson, Robert A. Scalapino, Roderick MacFarquhar, Robert W. Barnett, C.P. Fitzgerald, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jurgen Domes and Morton H. Halperin.

2. See: Quotations for Chairman Mao as well as Rejai (1969) for descriptions of the CCP's use of people's war in fighting both Japanese and the Kuomintang.

3. Of particular importance is that both Van Ness and Chalmers Johnson fall within this second category.

4. See: Mark Selden, 1971a and 1971b.

5. For an extremely instructive bibliography of Chinese foreign policy that stresses this type of categorization, see Dial, 1973.

6. Even though Bobrow's work (1968) is focused on American rather than Chinese decision making, his study is a notable exception.

7. In the era of "ping-pong diplomacy" this often overlooked level has become particularly important. It is often extremely subtle as the following description of a Thai-Chinese exchange reveals. "The first news came from the Thais, who announced that Hong Kong's badminton association had told the Thai badminton association to play in Hong Kong". The Thais said that there would be no objection to the badminton invitation and in the process a new cordiality in the Chinese-Thai relationship was achieved. Source, Deidre Ryan, 1972.

ENDNOTES AND REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

SECTION I

1. Huck presents an interesting and revealing discussion of this apparent contradiction. See, Huck, 1971: 28.

2. In fact, the CCP's leaders have repeatedly denounced "big power chauvinism" based on a reluctance to accept the political inequality it would imply. See: Houn, 1972: 6.

3. Ginsburg (1968) presents a very powerful argument that China's foreign policy is made much more understandable if Zones of Chinese interest (see, Peking Review, October 1, 1965 for an explanation of the first, second and third zones) paralleling the traditional world order (Ginsburg, 1968: 77) are taken into account. His conclusion that the Chinese "encourage wars of national liberation everywhere but in those Asian areas in which China's domination is desired" (89), is empirically untrue as the Vietnam case suggests. However, his thesis that Chinese foreign policy is significantly affected by strategic and political imagery based in part on historical circumstance and tradition, is most convincing.

4. Such an alternative could be "collective security" based on internation guarantees.

5. In this paper, the terms "Marxist-Leninist" and "Maoist" will be used rather interchangeably.

6. See, The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965, pp. 6-7.

7. The actual spirit of this internationalism and, indeed, the motive for declaring a principal contradiction at this time will be contrasted against nationalist ideals in the second section of this chapter. For an excellent discussion of the theoretical blend of the two, see: Isaiah Berlin, "The Bent Twig, A Note on Nationalism". Foreign Affiars, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1972), p. 21.

8. Gittings (1967) makes it very clear that the choice of the U.S.A. was by no means inevitable even at the ideological level. Rather, a whole series of interaction on specific policy issues precipitated the selection of the Americans.

9. For an analysis of the Chinese view of domestic politics and contradictions within the U.S. itself, see: Yuan-li Wu, *As Peking Sees Us: People's War in the United States*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969.

10. There are a host of studies that examine the theory and mechanics of this transformation. Johnson's work (1962) is probably the landmark in this area. More recently, Mark Selden (1971a, 1971b) has investigated some of the same topics in regard to people's war in Vietnam.

11. Donald Zagoria (1968) presents an excellent summary and analysis of each of these contending interpretations.

12. David Mozingo and Thomas Robinson (1965) provide an excellent appendix: "Parallels in the Lin Piao Article Between Chinese Communist History and Today", that expands this analogy.

13. For a clear statement of this position, see: "Rely on Your Own Efforts and Your Position is Invincible". *People's Daily*, July 10, 1966.

14. See, Franz Schurmann (1968) for an outstanding analysis of these levels as they operate within the PRC itself.

15. For some of these practical reasons, see: Huck (1971), Chapter 5.

16. J. Bowyer Bell (1971) presents a rather classic and imaginative attack on the PRC's policy.

17. It should also be noted that fear of overly antagonizing the Americans or Russians, as well as concern for the position of overseas Chinese both acted as constraints on Chinese action in a conventional sense as well as in supporting people's wars. See: Robinson, 1968: 74.

SECTION II

1. By becoming involved (even rhetorically) in untried struggles, Chinese endorsement can hinder the chances of its success by inducing a government crackdown on revolutionary groups, by reducing the possession of nationalist appeal or by inviting intervention. The Chinese are obviously aware of the dangers and judiciously omit the names of any particular group in the implicit endorsement. See, Chalmers Johnson, 1973: Ch. 3.

2. Other statements by Mao include proclamations of support for the American Negroes, Panama, and Japan, even though these latter three were not regarded as people's wars. All except the statement on the Dominican Republic are published together in a pamphlet--*Ch'uan shih-chieh jen-min t'uan-chieh ch'i-lai ta-pai mei-kuo ch'in-lueh-che chi ch'i yi-ch'ieh tsou-kou* (Peking: People's Press, 1965). The statement on the Dominican Republic (as are all the others) is available in *Jen-min jih-pao*, May 13, 1965.

3. The Haitian insurgency was later given an implicit endorsement, but only two years after the main fighting had died out. For a romantic insight into some elements of the Haitian struggle, see Graham Greene's *The Comedians*.

4. Ryan, 1972: 11.

5. Chinese service troops were used to rebuild roads and railways in North Vietnam. See: *New York Times*, Dec. 1, 1965, p. 1.

6. These other languages are Burmese, Cambodian, English, Esperanto, Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, Laotian, Malay, Mongolian, Tagalog, Thai, Vietnamese, Arabic, Hindi, Persian, Tamil, Turkish, French, Hausa, Italian, Portuguese and Swahili. There is no doubt that these communications serve the entire world.

7. The "official friendliness" measure includes:
    1) Diplomatic relations with Peking
    2) Vote cast in favour of the admission of Peking to the United Nations in 1965
    3) Trade with Communist China in either 1964 or 1965 totaling more than $75 million.

   The second measure, "official hostility" includes:
    1) Diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan
    2) Vote cast against the admission of Peking to the United Nations in 1965
    3) Signatory to a defense treaty with the West (Van Ness, 1971a, 170-1)

8. For a critical examination of Van Ness' framework and findings, see: Tsou (1974). Overall he is very impressed by Van Ness' work which "shows conclusively that contrary to Marxist theory, the existence of a feudal structure, colonialism and the status of being recipients of Western foreign aid were not determining factors for inclusion or exclusion as targets" (446). For other reviews, see: Rolph (1971) and Hudson (1970).

9. I can find no indication that this in fact was the Chinese plan, but it does seem that it was at least an ad hoc possibility

SECTION III

1. This chronological breakdown is the same one used by both Van Ness and Hinton except that Van Ness analyzes the "early period" as having begun in 1965 and Hinton sees it as having started in 1959 and the end of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

2. Although it is a rather technical point, there does exist a difference between the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and the "Cultural Revolution." The former is the term properly applied to the larger struggle that lasted several years. The latter refers to a very specific movement in the grander GPCR that was solely intended to revolutionize the arts. However, for convenience and deference to conformity, the "Cultural Revolution" will be used, but should be interpreted as meaning the GPCR.

3. Daubier's (1974) history of the entire struggle is the best historical record of the events of the Cultural Revolution that I have found. It pays considerable attention to the ideological undercurrents of the period and is strongly recommended.

4 There are examples of MFA personnel opposing the Red Guards. 91 employees of the MFA hung a "big-character" poster calling for moderation and denouncing Red Guard extremists. The exact fate of the "91" is not known, but they were eventually renounced by even their previous supporters such as Chen Yi. See: Yahuda, 1968: 107.

5. To the outside observer, the jargon of the Cultural Revolution was as complex as it was humorous. Maoists attacked their enemies with various phrases: revisionists, conservatives, bad elements, rightists, freaks, monsters, gangsters, snakes, worms and rats. Liu Shao-chih's supporters could only counter-attack with charges of extremism and subjectivism. There is no question who won the battle of sloganeering.

6. See, Badgley, John H. "Burma's China Crisis: The Choices Ahead". Asian Survey, November 1967, pp. 757-758.

7. The fact that less revolutions were acceptable due to the ideology of their revolutionary organizations compensated for Peking's increased belligerency. If this had not been the case, the number of TRs would have sky-rocketed.

8. See, Hinton, 1972: 290.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER II

SECTION I

1. There have been a number of other scholars who have used *PR* for similar purposes although on different topics. *See*, D'Silva, 1973 and Kim, 1974.

2. He notes that the others are: *Jen-min Jih-pao* (*People's Daily*), *Shih-chieh chih-shih* (*World Knowledge*), *Hung-ch'i* (*Red Flag*), *Hsin-hua, yueh-pao* (*New China Monthly*), *China Pictorial*, *China Reconstructs*, *Evergreen*, *People's China* and *Kung-tso t'ung hsun* (Bulletin of Activities). I conducted a brief survey of those magazines published in English, but none of them contained any information not to also be found in *PR*.

3. There is a strong possibility that the number of endorsements might rise by the end of the year. In the years I examined, the second half of any particular year usually witnessed a number of new endorsements. There is no reason to suspect that one or two new endorsements will not be added before the end of 1974 making the total almost equal to the two previous years.

4. See Trager, 1974 for an excellent discussion of why this endorsement has been dropped.

5. However, it should also be noted that Latin American struggles have repeatedly been mentioned in the "Covert Report" category and it therefore appears that despite the lack of recent endorsements, Peking still has an eye turned toward the region.

6. These synonyms include a plethora of analagous denunciations They include, practitioners of political skullduggery, big power hegemonist, feverish aggressor ambitious reactionary, imperialist-fascist warmonger, monopoly capitalist clique, frenzied expansionist, bully, decadent and moribund overlord, and sinister plotter. The Third World governments that have either supported the U.S. or taken an anti-Chinese line have received equally colorful titles-flunkeys, lackeys, puppets, running dogs, dupes, stooges and jackals.

SECTION II

1. The editorial was reprinted in *PR*, October 6, 1972: 9-11.

2. Kim uses *PR* a number of times to demonstrate Chinese concerns.

3. For the nature of this "pragmatic" outlook, see, Kim, 1974: 314-316.

4. It should be stressed that the PRC has not been totally passive by any stretch of the imagination. Vigorous denouncements of superpower hegemonism and vociferous advocacy of Third World "struggle and unity" have also been dominant themes in the PRC's U.N. conduct. However, these radical concerns have been voiced in a more or less conventional manner such as U.N. speeches and so forth.

5. It need be cautioned that Peking's support is not as complete as might first be assumed. In respect to her own Third World membership, the PRC has also maintained its own identity on issues such as "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace". See, Kim, 1974; 313. The united front is not as united as Chinese statements might suggest.

6. See the introduction to this chapter for reference to this point.

SECTION III

1. For an excellent example of this alarmist reasoning, see Leo Yueh, 1972.

2. There appears to be no let up in the occurance of armed struggles in the Third World. In the Journal of Contemporary Revolutions quarterly summary of revolutionary activity around the world, there is no indication of a decline in the level of insurgency. This fact eliminates the hypothesis that the reduction of Chinese support parallels a drop in the number of armed uprisings. The Chinese are clearly pursuing a more restricted pattern of endorsements than in the past.

3. Concerning the demise of Lin Piao, it should be stressed that the author of "Long Live the Victory of People's War" has been attacked for domestic political reasons rather than ideological or international ones. Further, if the Chinese had any intentions of using Lin as a straw man for an attack or reversal of their previous international strategy, they would have directly attacked Lin's article, which in fact they have not done.

4. The Chinese obviously considered the speech to be of considerable importance as PR reprinted it in its entirety in two consecutive issues. It can be found in No. 15, April 12, 1974, Special Supplement Sections as well as in No. 16, April 19, 1974, pps. 6-11. I have quoted from the latter.

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